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Note to Reader
This is the first draft of a book manuscript. As such, it is not a
final book, but rather a work-in-progress. Because it addresses
pressing issues, I have decided to share this first draft with readers. I
am eager to receive your comments and feedback. I apologize for
typographical errors, stylistic infelicities, and substantive errors—all
mine. Please send me your thoughts and comments, preferably by
way of comments on the Open Review website that hosts this first
draft (http://harcourt.cooperation.law.columbia.edu) or by email to
cccct@law.columbia.edu.
I thank you in advance, Bernard E. Harcourt.

***

Special thanks to Mia Ruyter for critical conversations over the
past six months. Special thanks as well for exceptional support and
assistance to Fonda Shen for editorial, research, and bibliographic
work; to Alexis Marin for research in nineteenth-century political
theory; to Tanveer Singh for research on contemporary coöperatives,
credit unions, and mutuals; and to Julia Udell for research on the
2020 bailouts. All errors are entirely mine.

© Bernard E. Harcourt 2020 – All Rights Reserved
Columbia Center for Contemporary Critical Thought
Columbia University, New York City
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Introduction: For Coöperation
In response to an infamous provocation: “What is property?”, Pierre-Joseph
1
Proudhon famously answered in 1840: “Property is theft!”
The paradox could hardly have been greater. The idea of theft, after all,
presumes property. Proudhon’s detractors ridiculed his argument.
But Proudhon was onto something—something that remains crucial today:
namely, that the government’s enforcement of its property rules can do extreme
violence to our ideals of justice. It can rob us of our sense of self, of our own labor,
of our very autonomy—and even, sometimes, of our lives.
Proudhon, the first self-proclaimed anarchist, militated for the abolition of
property. Not just the equality of property or the fair distribution of property, he
2
declared: “I demand, as a measure of general security, its entire abolition.”
Proudhon proposed instead an economic regime based simply on
possession. “Suppress property while maintaining possession, and by this simple
modification of the principle, you will revolutionize the law, government, economy,
and institutions,” Proudhon declared: “you will drive evil from the face of the
3
earth.”

***
By contrast to Proudhon, I would not draw the line merely at possession.
Possession is just another type of property right. It is simply another variety of theft.
No, contra Proudhon, I would abolish a particular kind of property: today, in
the United States, it is capital that must be eradicated.
One of the greatest sources of evil in society today is capital, understood as
the investor’s alienable stake in an enterprise in which the only true interest is to
maximize the return regardless of the wellbeing of others.
What must be abolished today, then, is not property, but the kind of property
constituted by capital.
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Shares of stock, the transferrable equity of a corporation, the alienable
shareholder’s stake of corporate finance: that is a major source of evil in today’s
extractive capitalist economy.
Capital elevates selfish profit over human welfare. It detaches the owner of
capital from any real investment in the lives of all those who work for or are
associated with the enterprise. It turns the possessor of capital into a mere
speculator on other people’s lives.
The ordinary stockholder has one primary interest: to maximize the return
on their capital investment, to draw larger dividends, to sell their stock at a higher
value. Their interest is to extract more from the enterprise via their equity stake;
to squeeze out more from everyone who is associated with the enterprise; to eke
out more from the workers; to manipulate share price through stock buy-backs and
other devices; to inflate future prospects—in effect, to make out like a bandit, to
make out like a thief!

***
Definitions matter. By “capital,” I mean equity, shares of stock, in essence the
alienable financial stake in a public corporation or enterprise. Capital is the
transferable equity interest in an ongoing publicly traded enterprise.
This differs from other possible definitions of the term “capital.” Thomas
Piketty, in his best-selling book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, defines capital
4
as any non-human asset. Capital represents, for Piketty, wealth. To Katharina
Pistor, in The Code of Capital, capital represents only a limited set of assets that are
legally privileged: assets become capital when lawyers bestow on them certain
5
attributes of priority, durability, universality, and convertibility. Karl Marx, much
before them, defined capital specifically as the money received from the sale of
commodities that is then used as a mode of production to buy other commodities,
6
equipment, or labor.
None of that is what I have in mind—though those definitions may well have
their place in empirical, legal, or economic analyses. For my purposes, capital is
defined in its corporate finance meaning: capital is transferrable ownership shares
of publicly traded companies.

***
Most people who own stocks today—whether directly or indirectly—hold them as
a form of speculation to increase the overall return on their savings and to grow
7
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their wealth—if possible, to grow their wealth more than others, and more than
the market, since that is the only way effectively to get richer, and richer than
others.
But this is nothing more than gambling on other people’s livelihoods—more
often than not, today, on other people’s misery. It is nothing more than an effort to
extract wealth from an enterprise, from its consumers or workers, from all the
people whose livelihoods depend on the business.
This kind of property—capital—has turned into a plague that has
transformed ours into an extractive and punitive society. One marked by
unconscionable (and growing) wealth inequality; by hyper-militarized policing used
to enforce gross property inequalities; by a caste system that subjugates persons
of color, building on the harrowing legacy of slavery and Jim Crow, of the genocide
of Native peoples, of the age-long exploitation of Hispanic, Asian, and other
migrants to this country.
This kind of property, capital, must now be abolished.

***
Whenever progress toward justice has occurred in history—however
precariously—it has been achieved through limitations on kinds of property.
The abolition of slavery put an end to one kind of property: human chattel
property.
The emancipation of women put an end to another kind of property: human
marital property or coverture, a husband’s property in his wife.
The decline of feudalism, much earlier, put an end to serfdom: property
relations that tied humans to land.
It is now time to abolish the kind of property, capital, that effectively ties
human livelihood to equity.
Like those other kinds of property that were abolished, capital also bears a
reprehensible relationship to human life, insofar as it is a form of speculation on
the lives of others that ties their fates to share value.
It is only by decapitating this property that we can end the scourge of
extractive capitalism and put in place a new political economic regime of
coöperationism.
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This ambition must be understood as continuing W.E.B. Du Bois’s project—
and the promise—of Abolition Democracy.7

***
The only way forward today is through a genuine legal, political, and economic
revolution that replaces the logic of capital extraction with coöperative, mutualist,
and non-profit enterprises.
The legal structure that grounds the corporation must be replaced with a
new framework that equitably circulates the wealth generated from production
and consumption.
The many of us who create, invent, produce, work, and serve others need to
displace the few who extract and hoard capital, and put in place a new
coöperationism that favors the equitable and sustainable distribution of economic
growth and wealth creation.
These alternative legal forms have existed for centuries and surround us
today. They include worker coöperatives for producing and manufacturing, credit
unions for banking, housing coöperatives for living, mutuals for insuring, producer,
retailer, and consumer coöperatives for commercial exchange, and non-profit
organizations for good works and learning.
Coöperationism is also the only way to address head-on the global climate
crisis. The goal of coöperation is not to maximize the extraction of capital, but to
support and maintain all of the participants in the enterprise and to distribute
wellbeing, which depends on an ecologically healthy environment. The logic,
principles, and values of coöperationist arrangements can serve to slow down our
consumption-at-all-cost society.

***
A future based on coöperationism is no mere fantasy. Coöperationist enterprises
surround us today and thrive. In many respects, they already outperform and
outlast conventional publicly traded firms. They also often show themselves to be
more resilient during economic downturns.
Existing coöperationist enterprises permeate the economy: Land O’Lakes,8
Sunkist,9 and Ocean Spray are producer coöperatives.10 State Farm and Liberty
Mutual are mutual insurance companies.11 R.E.I. is a consumer coöperative, and
Ace Hardware a retailer coöperative.12 Isthmus Engineering and Manufacturing in
Madison,13 Cooperative Home Care in the Bronx,14 and AK Press in California are
9
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worker coöperatives.15 The Navy Federal Credit Union,16 with over $125 billion in
assets and 8 million members, is a member credit union. And non-profit
educational, cultural, and social institutions surround us.
Existing coöperationist enterprises can be as large as multinationals. The
Mondragon coöperative consortium headquartered in Spain—a diversified
enterprise manufacturing heavy equipment—employs over 70,000 workers and
brings in annual revenues in the billions of euros.17
Existing coöperationist enterprises can dominate the competition and be
technological leaders in their field. Swann-Morton, a worker coöperative in
Sheffield, England, is a world leader in manufacturing and selling surgical blades
and scalpels, and exports to over 100 countries around the globe. Founded in 1932
on the principle that “claims of individuals producing in an industry come first,”
18
Swann-Morton has estimated annual revenues today in the range of $50 million.
There are today myriad coöperationist enterprises run by and for members,
workers, producers, or consumers, that fuel our economy and defy the extractive
logics of capital.

***
Take but one example: the Mondragon coöperative consortium, headquartered in
Catalonia, Spain, which manufactures automotive components, construction and
industrial equipment, household equipment, and machine tools.19
Mondragon is composed of over 100 independent worker coöperatives,
which, including subsidiaries, employ over 70,000 workers in about 65 countries. 20
The consortium also includes a banking enterprise.
The individual member coöperatives are fully worker owned. In each, the pay
disparity between employees is capped, with highest-paid directors earning a
maximum of four-and-a-half times the salary of the lowest-paid worker.21
The distribution of profits is decided by a general assembly at each member
coöperative: at least 10% goes to a social fund, at least 20% goes to the reserve
fund, and a maximum of 70% is deposited directly to the members’ individual
accounts.22 The member coöperatives utilize the principle of “one worker one vote
regardless of the share of capital owned.”23
The consortium recently brought in revenues of 6 billion euros.24

***
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The modalities for coöperationist enterprises are simple and, by now, well
understood and worked out—whether they involve credit unions, insurance
mutuals, non-profit organizations, or worker, producer, consumer, and retailer
coöperatives.
For member-owned coöperatives, the capital in the business is replaced by
the aggregated membership stake in the ongoing enterprise.
In a consumer coöperative, like R.E.I., all of the users (the consumers of the
enterprise) are invited to become coöperative members for a small fee, in the case
of R.E.I. only $20. Those membership fees accumulate, in the aggregate, to form
the members’ stake that effectively replaces equity capital. With 7 million eligible
voting members at R.E.I. as of December 31, 2019,25 the members’ equity stood at
$312 million. Including retained earnings, the total members’ equity surpassed $1
billion.
In a worker coöperative, each worker-member is required over time to
contribute the equivalent of a portion of their salary, which becomes their stake in
the enterprise. At Mondragon, for example, each worker at a member coöperative
must contribute one year’s salary, which can also be borrowed at low interest from
their credit union, Caja Laboral. A member then opens an individual account at the
credit union that is credited with yearly profits (or losses) at their coöperative; the
account accrues interest similarly to a savings account.26 The worker-member
contributions, aggregated, serve as the equity of the coöperative that can be
invested in equipment, machinery, research and design.
By 2020, practically all the kinks of coöperationist enterprises have been
worked out. We know how to make coöperation possible. We know how to make
it work.

***
Defenders of capital will respond that equity investments funnel resources to the
most productive and efficient economic producers, thus ensuring enhanced
economic growth and prosperity for all. If wealth is properly directed to the more
performing enterprises, they argue, it will create more jobs and will spread out the
benefits of economic production. The rising tide will lift all boats: the increased
return on capital will be spent as consumption, fueling the economy, creating jobs,
and spreading the wealth.
But these arguments are purely ideological. They have no empirical basis. If
anything, they are belied by social reality. The condition of the average American
11
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worker, the shrinking middle class, the growing impoverished majority in the
United States—these utterly betray the ideological claims of capital.
The best empirical evidence shows mounting levels of inequality within the
post-industrial, Western, capitalist societies and growing indebtedness within the
major economies—to the point where many of the supposedly wealthiest
27
countries have effectively hocked their common.
The idea that capital investment is magically lifting all boats is fantasy. The
reality of the COVID-19 economic crash and its stark inequalities based on race,
class, and poverty, show the lie of the claims of capital.

***
28

What of the $38 billion in corporate equity in the United States? Where would all
that money go? After all, capital represents money that individuals ultimately own
and place in the markets—either directly through brokerage accounts, holdings of
mutual funds, or retirement accounts, or indirectly through pensions or savings
accounts that are then invested in the market (or loaned out for investment
purposes) by banks. What would happen to it all?
Well, first, a substantial portion of it would be converted into membership
contributions that would be placed in the coöperative enterprises and accrue
wealth for the consumers, workers, or other coöperative members.
Another substantial portion, second, could be lent to coöperative and
mutualist enterprises as ordinary debt (bond obligations) to support expansion of
the enterprises (whether to buy equipment and facilities for manufacturing, or
goods and commodities for consumption, etc.).
As for the rest, this may be surprising, but it is basically borrowed wealth that
does not amount to that much. Well over two thirds of it in the United States, in
effect, is canceled out by national debt.
At the end of June 2020, the national debt in the U.S. exceeded $26 trillion
and was mounting at a stunning clip, up more than $3 trillion in the first six months
of 2020. In total, that’s about $212,000 in debt per American taxpayer, or $80,000
per citizen.29
Our capital prosperity in this country is a figment of our national debt. If we
think about capital accumulation holistically, the equity in private hands in the
United States is offset by the collective debt we owe as a nation.
12
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In effect, our prosperity, concentrated in the hands of the few, is nothing
more than borrowed wealth.

***
How then could we eliminate capital?
Well, it is as easy as rewriting the laws of incorporation or revising the tax
code. With a stroke of the pen, we could prohibit capital and mandate instead
coöperationist corporate charters; or we could effectively disfavor capital to the
benefit of coöperationist arrangements by, for example, taxing capital returns at a
steeper capital gains rate.
Mechanically, the process of abolishing capital is simply a matter of repealing
and replacing the law of corporations. Politically, it might be more complicated. It
might even require a revolution. So be it.
We abolished human chattel property. We can abolish equity capital.

***
The Black Death—the plague epidemics of fourteenth century Europe—
contributed to the demise of serfdom relations as a kind of property.
The Reconstruction Amendments brought about the end of another kind of
property—human slavery.
Today, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the unsustainability of our
extractive punitive society.
This is a day of reckoning. It is time to bring about the demise of another kind
of property. It may not solve all the problems of injustice, but it will be one gigantic
step in the right direction.
It is time to replace capital with coöperation. It is time to displace our
extractive capitalism with a legal, political, and economic framework that favors
coöperation and collaboration between those who create, invent, produce, make,
work, labor, and serve others.
In the end, rather than corporations that extract capital for the few
shareholders and managers, we need mutuals, coöperatives, unions, and nonprofits that distribute the wealth they create widely to everyone in the shared
enterprise—and continually guard against the gross disparities and inequalities,
especially along racial lines, that now characterize our economy.
13
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Chapter 1. Coöperation Today
Coöperation surrounds us today and thrives in the social and economic spheres. It
is, however, disfavored and discouraged by our tax system, our laws, our politics,
and our reigning ideologies. Capital, by contrast, is favored through all kinds of
incentives and preferences, such as low capital gains tax rates, retirement account
structures, government bailouts, the fetishization and legal treatment of the stock
markets, and the ideology of pioneering individualism. Today, the material reality
and the public imagination in Western liberal democracies, especially in the United
States, is stacked against coöperation and in favor of capital competition.
This makes it all the more remarkable that coöperationist enterprises
actually flourish in capitalist economies. Even though the entire weight of American
law, politics, and ideology presses against coöperation, these kinds of solidaristic
arrangements can be found practically everywhere and, in some industries,
permeate the field. Just imagine what we could achieve today if these types of
social and economic ventures were favored.
The insurance industry, for instance, has always been home to large and
resilient mutualist societies. Half of the largest 10 property and casualty insurance
companies, in fact, are mutuals, and together, those five mutual insurance
companies serve 25% of the entire market (by contrast, the other five largest nonmutual insurance companies serve only 21% of the market).30 Most of the
household-name insurance companies—State Farm, Liberty Mutual, New York Life,
Nationwide, Northwestern Mutual, Mutual of Omaha, etc.—are mutuals and are
extremely resilient. The median age of a U.S. mutual insurance company is about
120 years.31
The financial sector as well is populated by credit unions, which developed
importantly starting in 1920 with the Massachusetts Association of Credit Unions
and in 1934 with federal laws enabling their formation. Credit unions gained lasting
status by surviving the Great Depression and the financial crises in the 1980s, and
today have over 100 million members in the United States.32 In a country like
France, the Crédit Agricole Group, which is formed by 39 regional banks that are
full-fledged coöperative entities, serves over 21 million customers, and has over 9.3
million member-clients at the local level.33 As of September 2018, Crédit Agricole
had 23.3% of French household deposits and total assets of 1.7 trillion Euros.34
15
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Farmer and producer coöperatives, consumer, worker, and retailer
coöperatives thrive across economic sectors today—again, despite everything
being stacked in favor of capital. In fact, and quite surprisingly, coöperatives in the
United States “survive through their first six to 10 years at a rate 7% higher than
traditional small businesses.”35 To get a preliminary sense of things, let’s quickly
take a whirlwind tour of some of these collaborations in the United States and
abroad.

Mutual Insurance | State Farm
Insurance mutuals run by and for policy holders, and not investors, are part of the
very fabric of the founding of this country. In the United States, the first mutual
insurance company was founded by Benjamin Franklin in 1752, the Philadelphia
Contributionship for the Insurance of Houses from Loss by Fire. Mutuals have a
track record of longevity and resilience, and represent a large portion of the
insurance industry—as noted, the five largest mutuals serve 25% of the market.36
Not just in the United States, but across the globe, mutual insurance has
proven to be especially effective at mitigating financial risk, particularly in the labor
market.37 Many mutuals arose among guild members as a way to reduce
information asymmetries, insofar as those sharing the same profession were
exposed to similar risks but could use the mutuals to even out the probability of
those risks harming them.38
Mutual insurance has been growing across the globe. Since 2006, mutuals
have been “the fastest growing part of the global insurance market, moving from a
market share of 23.4% in 2007 to 27.3% in 2013.”39 Three of the top 10 largest
insurance companies in the world are mutuals: National Mutual Insurance
Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives (Zenkyoren) in Japan, and State Farm and
the Kaiser Foundation in the United States.40
Membership in a mutual insurance company is typically based on holding a
policy. Although that membership stake is not equivalent to an equity interest,
since it cannot be freely sold or exchanged, it serves as the source of funding to
operate the business. In effect, mutuals are funded either by the membership stake
of current or prospective policyholders or by loans that are borrowed and paid off
by operating profits.41 What is unique about the mutual insurance company, by
contrast to capitalized insurance, is that the policyholder is “the sole focus” of a
mutual insurance company.42
16
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State Farm, the largest auto insurance company in the United States, with
17% of the market, is a good illustration. Originally founded in 1922 as State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company by George J. Mecherle, it began and grew
as a way to capture a low-risk segment of the market. Mecherle was an Illinois
farmer who became an insurance salesman and then decided to concentrate on
selling automobile insurance to farmers at low rates.43 Mecherle’s working
assumption was that rural and small-town drivers had lower accident rates than
city dwellers or the nation at large, and so together could save money through
lower rates in a mutual insurance company.44 The operation quickly surpassed $1
million in revenue by 1928, and it then opened an office in Berkeley. After auto
insurance, State Farm went into life insurance in 1929 and fire insurance in 1935,
reaching one million policies by 1944.45
Today, approximately one out of every five cars in the United States is
insured through State Farm, and there are over 16,000 agents across the country.46
It is now one of the largest auto and home insurers in the country. As of its 2019
Annual Report, State Farm had over $178 billion in assets and a net income of $2.3
billion.47
At State Farm, member policyholders are the stakeholders. They elect the
board of directors at an annual meeting that all members may attend. The firstnamed insured has a right to vote by proxy or in person.48 The board decides on the
vision and operations without any outside investor influence. Given the group’s
structure and principles, State Farm employees receive “ample group health,
disability and dental plans” alongside traditional retirement plans and one-on-one
financial planning; the company will provide $5,000 in assistance to any adoptions
of children and a full workday off to help with schooling.49
According to Crain’s Chicago Business, in a head-to-head comparison with a
non-mutual like Allstate, the main difference in performance is due to coöperative
ownership: “State Farm has more leeway to compete on price with the likes of
Geico and Progressive, because its customer-owners benefit from any price cuts.”50
By contrast, for an institution that is beholden to stockholders rather than
policyholders, “every dime Allstate spends on claims or price cuts is one less dime
for shareholders.”51 Since 2001, despite encroaching market entrants such as Geico
and Progressive, “State Farm has an enviable position of being very over-capitalized
and mutual status with no stockholder-earnings pressures.”52

17
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Credit Unions | Crédit Agricole, France
Credit unions and coöperative banks also have a long history dedicated to
the welfare of their member accountholders. They too share in a form of
democratic governance and mutualism53: typically, any account holder may
become a member, will receive shares, and will have one vote regardless of the
number of shares they have.54 The ownership rights thus stem only from
membership, not from the number of shares, which lowers the potential for
takeovers. The bank’s equity consists of those shares. The ambition of these unions
is to promote the well-being of their members, rather than to maximize profit, since
the business is not run for profit.55
Historically, there have been different models of coöperative banking,
including coöperative banks, credit unions, and building societies.56 Coöperative
banks started as a result of social movements during the 1850s, especially in
Germany, and evolved along different lines.57 One model, known as the SchulzeDelitzsch model of coöperative credit or a “People’s Bank,” uses a general assembly
as its main body for governance, allows for the election of executives and control
entities, and pays members dividends derived from operating profits.58 A second
model, the Raiffeisen model, was adapted from the first model for more rural
conditions and aimed to “render social co-living more harmonious.”59 Both models
took on the form of “credit unions” in the United States and Canada. Building
societies in the United Kingdom were initially meant to be “terminating”—in the
sense that they would serve to finance housing among a group of members, but
then dissolve; but these societies grew to be permanent with additional services
offered to customers. In the United States, “building societies” took on the form of
“savings and loans.” Today, savings and loans hold about $209 billion in assets and
supplement the larger credit union sector.60
In the United States, credit unions developed in the early twentieth century,
with federal laws enabling their formation in 1934. They thrived in part by surviving
the Great Depression and the financial crises of the 1980s, and they now have over
100 million members.61 By contrast to European credit unions, those in the United
States tend to only do business with members and are focused on consumer
lending.62
One of the reasons that coöperative banking is so robust is that it often works
hand-in-hand with coöperative enterprises. International Raiffeisen Union
estimates that over 900,000 coöperatives with over 500 million members in over
100 countries are working using coöperative banking principles.63 Rabobank in the
18
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Netherlands, for instance, the largest agricultural bank in the world, reaches 50%
of Dutch citizens and is rated the world’s third safest bank (as per 2009).64
The potential of credit unions is illustrated well by the Crédit Agricole Group
in France, one of the country’s leading banking institution. The Crédit Agricole
Group is composed of 39 regional coöperative banks that together serve over 21
million customers and 9.3 million member-clients.65 This represented, in 2018,
23.3% of French household deposits or total assets of 1.7 trillion Euros.66
Crédit Agricole began in 1885, as a local initiative, with the creation of the
Société de Crédit Agricole de l’arrondissement de Poligny.67 The year before, the
French government had passed the Act of 1884, legalizing farming coöperatives as
authorized professional associations in response to farmers having trouble
accessing credit. A decade later, the Act of November 1894 allowed the creation of
local agricultural banks by members of farm coöperatives. These ultimately
“formed the foundation of the institutional ‘pyramid’ created by Crédit Agricole.”68
The next layer, regional banks, were authorized by an Act in 1899 that helped
enable the Banque de France to supply funds to farmer coöperatives. In the
aftermath of World War I, another piece of legislation, the Act of August 1920,
created the “Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole” (CNCA) (renamed as such in 1926)
to act as a central clearing organization for the regional banks. Crédit Agricole
became self-financing in 1963 after creating a dense nationwide network and
raising funds though notes and long-term bonds.69 In 1988, Crédit Agricole Regional
Banks bought the CNCA and transformed the entity into a limited liability company,
completely independent of the state. More recently, the CNCA (the central clearing
house) was listed on the stock exchange in 2001, resulting in a hybrid entity now
that accompanies the 39 fully coöperative banks.70
Today, after the public listing of the CNCA, the Crédit Agricole Group is a
complex organization, but one that is essentially run by the 39 regional
coöperatives that have the majority stake in the total enterprise.71 This hybrid
model, in which the regional coöperatives own 54% of the entity, allows for the
raising of some capital, while maintaining the credit union’s ethical values as a
coöperative. Crédit Agricole, for instance, has vowed not to sell its members’ data
and to “not operate in countries that do not exchange fiscal information to avoid
tax evasion.”72
Credit unions differ from speculative banks and offer “real benefit for
members who are represented in governance structures.”73 As member-owned,
they can care less about profits and more about maintaining market share—which
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is reflected in the fact that mutual banks maintain three-fifths of the banking
market in France.74

Producer Coöperatives | Land O’Lakes
Producer coöperatives are especially prevalent in agriculture and farming, in
which many companies operating under coöperative principles have become
household names, such as Land O’Lakes, Sunkist, or Ocean Spray.
Land O’Lakes, for instance, is a farmer-owned food and agricultural
coöperative that is now a Fortune 200 and operates under several well-known
trademarks, including Land O’Lakes, Purina Animal Nutrition, and WinField
Solutions. Land O’Lakes classifies itself as a “farmer- and retail-owned cooperative”
with a primary focus on “always supporting member-owners,” as the company
states in its Annual Report for 2019.75 The organization spans horizontally across
the agricultural field, from seed and crop inputs, to B2B marketing, to branded
good sales, and, of course, to butter.76
Land O’Lakes originally started about one hundred years ago as the
Minnesota Cooperative Creameries Association, the product of 320 dairy farmers
meeting in St. Paul, Minnesota, with the purpose, in their own words, to “joint
together to effectively market and distribute members’ dairy production across the
country.”77 Land O’Lakes is now governed by a board of directors that is elected by
its members—nearly half are elected by the dairy producers and the other half are
elected by the agricultural members.78 The directors are elected to four-year terms
at the organization’s annual meetings by voting members. The board determines
“policies and business objectives, controls financial policy, and hires the CEO.”79
As of February 2020, Land O’Lakes consists of 1,711 dairy producers, 744
agricultural producers, and 989 agricultural retailers.80 And it is doing extremely
well. Land O’Lakes has net sales of $14 billion, net earnings of $207 million, and
returns $187 million in cash to its members.

Consumer Coöperatives | R.E.I.
Consumer coöperatives also surround us, especially locally in the food and
grocery sector, and they have weathered difficult economic times well. The sports
apparel and equipment chain, Recreational Equipment, Inc., better known as R.E.I.,
is a good illustration. Founded in 1938 by a small group of Pacific Northwest
mountaineers who were seeking out quality mountain climbing equipment, R.E.I.
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is now one of the country’s best-known specialty outdoor retail companies. And it
operates fully as a consumer coöperative.81
R.E.I. began back in 1935 when a couple of Seattle-based outdoorspeople,
Lloyd and Mary Anderson, were trying to buy quality ice picks and couldn’t find
them at the right price at local ski shops. They decided to buy directly from
wholesalers in Austria at a price of $3.50 per ice axe, including postage, instead of
about $20.82 The Andersons started collecting money from friends who wanted to
get in on their discovery, and they built up a wholesale purchasing operation. They
officially formed the coöperative with the aid of a lawyer in 1938. The original
mission statement from a bulletin published in 1938 reads as follows:
Intent of the founders of this organization was to secure sufficient
membership to make group buying possible; to distribute the goods
with as little overheads expense as possible, using membership
cooperation with the work as much as possible; to gradually build
up a reserve of purchasing stock; to have the membership fee
($1.00) so that everyone interested will be financially able to join.83
R.E.I. was modeled in part on the Rochdale Pioneers Society of 1844 in
England which is considered one of the first successful consumer coöperatives.
Rochdale “established the principles of linking voting rights to persons rather than
shares” and first put in place a “dividend on purchases,” basically a patronage
refund.84
Membership in R.E.I. is open to all persons who pay the membership fee,
which is a single time fee of $20 for lifetime membership with all voting rights in
the affairs of R.E.I., including electing its board of directors.85 Members are entitled
to dividends, relative to the amount of merchandise an individual member
purchases from R.E.I. throughout the year, as well as to member-only discounts.86
Members are sent candidate profiles for the board along with their annual
dividend.87 The board of directors is ten to fourteen directors in size; each elected
director serves for three years and can have maximum of four consecutive terms.88
As a member, R.E.I. gives back 10% of the price paid on goods purchased through
an annual dividend in March.89
Today, R.E.I. operates more than 160 retail stores throughout the United
States. It has over 19 million members.90 It had net sales of over $3 billion,
according to their last reported financial statements, year-end 2018.91 According to
a former CEO of R.E.I., interviewed in The Atlantic, being a coöp allows for the
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management team—unlike a publicly traded company that has earnings calls that
affect stock prices—to take a longer-term perspective and focus on growth over a
five or ten year horizon.92

Worker Coöperatives | Isthmus Engineering
Worker coöperatives have a long history of bringing democracy and equality
to the workplace. They instantiate the values of solidarity and coöperation—and
the principles of one person, one vote. In a worker coöperative, the workers are
owners and have a vote and equal say to create a democratic workplace.93 If there
were ever one form of coöperation that instantiates the ideals of solidarity,
mutuality, and social justice, it is the worker coöp.
A lot of economic theory suggests that worker coöperatives will have a hard
time operating because of the costs associated with collective decision-making.
John Hansmann’s classic work in corporate organization, The Ownership of
Enterprise, for instance, stipulates that firms are more successful when they are
more efficient in reducing transaction costs—the costs to operate and generate
profit; and that, given the lower number of coöperatives than ordinary
corporations, there must be a high transaction cost impediment that is offsetting
the advantage of coöperatives.94 The transaction costs in a coöperative model tend
to be the more burdensome demands of collective governance, since all the views
of members must be considered. But those costs are offset by other factors, such
as the enhanced labor incentive given the vested stake worker-owners have in the
enterprise.95 In many cases, the advantages trump. If our tax code and politics
favored coöperatives, there is no question they would thrive.
A good illustration is the Isthmus Engineering & Manufacturing Co-Op
(“Isthmus Engineering” or simply “I.E.M.”), based in Madison, Wisconsin. Isthmus
Engineering builds robotic machines for industrial companies.96 It has been used as
a case study in successful worker coöperatives,97 which is especially noteworthy
given that it operates in a high-technology environment that is often believed to be
more competitive and difficult.98
Isthmus Engineering started as a partnership of three mechanical engineers
(who knew of each other through work with a family-owned business) and a
bookkeeper. They performed contract engineering for nearby businesses and
worked out of the home of one of the partners.99 New partners were brought in
who had additional skills and required more flexibility in entry (and exit) than a
limited liability partnership allowed. Two of the partners heard about the success
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of the Mondragon coöperative in Spain at a conference, and so they all decided to
incorporate the partnership as a coöperative using attorneys and advisors.100 The
coöperative now includes 29 worker-owners, and membership in the coöperative
is open to all employees.101
The decision to turn the partnership into a coöperative involved some
personal financial risk by members of the coöperative since each one of them was
underwriting a portion of the bank loan through co-signs.102 But the enterprise
proved successful. And I.E.M. has grown from two customers in the automotive
industry in the early 1980s to a larger customer base with a skilled labor force.
I.E.M. now has annual revenues exceeding $15 million.
In the initial 12 years after incorporating as a coöperative in 1982, I.E.M. grew
from 8 to 50 members. The membership fee was described as “the price of a small
car.”103 The coöperative was structured into an administrative staff and five areas
of “sales, controls (electrical) engineering, mechanical engineering, controls
(electrical) assembly, mechanical assembly and machining.”104 Out of the 50
employees, 29 were considered “worker-owners,” and served on a board of
directors that met biweekly to govern. I.E.M. terminated some memberships in the
1990s and established a more rigorous membership process in the 2000s that
remains open to every employee, but “gives the board significant flexibility in
considering applications.”105
In order to become a member today, one has to have been a full-time
employee for two years to apply. Unless an application is rejected by two-thirds of
the membership, the applicant proceeds to board member interviews and an
invitation to join open and closed sessions of board meetings. Applicants can serve
on board committees during this phase. One of the only limits is that only one
applicant can be considered at a time.106 If the application is successful, meaning
no more than three to five votes against it, the applicant is invited to join the
coöperative conditional upon buying a share of the coöperative, priced around
$20,000.107 The principles of the coöperative are that “All owners must be workers,
all owners serve on the Board, and all workers are eligible for ownership.”108
In terms of income, practically all of the workers (apart from the sales
manager and general manager) receive hourly wages that are set on a scale from
when the worker is first hired. The hourly wages do not change when a worker
becomes an owner, but there is no longer a benefits package. Owners only receive
wages if Isthmus Engineering is profitable.109 At the end of the year, owners “pay a
certain percentage of their total earnings into common equity and receive a certain
23
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3702010

share as dividends.”110 When an employee-owner leaves the coöperative, their
stock and equity is repurchased.
There are, of course, costs associated with a worker coöperative. At times,
to sustain growth and requests from customers, I.E.M. has been forced to utilize
contract workers or has been forced to offset a potential lay-off by spreading the
“lack of work” across multiple coöperative members (e.g., instead of getting rid of
a 40-hour a week position, four workers are asked to work 30-hour weeks until the
work picks up).111
But there are many offsetting benefits. Mostly, given lack of outside equity,
the coöperative structure allows, even encourages, the group to focus on long-term
strategies. There is little pressure to produce short-term profits at the expense of
longevity.112 Moreover, as worker-owners, line workers and those working on
project teams are—or at least state that they are—more self-motivated, in part
because of the lack of hierarchy and the fact that they feel they have no one to
answer to. There is also a certain amount of mutual monitoring that leads to a sense
of empowerment and is a source of motivation to work. This reflects the absence
of a manager-employee relationship, which apparently is felt positively by nonowning employees as well.113 Even among the latter, apparently, there is a strong
negative feeling about employees downplaying their work by invoking their status
as “only” an employee.”114 Similarly, there is a strong feeling that members should
not leverage their ownership-status.
Overall, the focus of Isthmus Engineering has been sustainability. In the
words of one member: “Most companies would correlate profit margins with the
size of the company. That’s the last thing we do. Before profit, the first thing is
sustainability.”115 And given its coöperative principle of “Concern for Community,”
Isthmus Engineering mobilized to produce and donate thousands of face shields to
local clinics and coöperatives nationwide in face of the COVID-19 crisis. It also
helped the Medical College of Wisconsin create custom tooling to expedite
production as part of the “Milwaukee Million Mask Challenge” (an effort by United
Way to meet demand).116
Worker coöperatives come in varied forms and under different names. They
can be structured as a partnership or a limited liability corporation, so long as they
abide by the principles of coöperatives, especially the “one vote principle” and nonhierarchy.117
Another form of worker coöperative is called the “benefit corporation.”
Benefit corporations are traditional companies that take on a modified obligation
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toward accountability, transparency, and purpose, with a commitment to creating
what is called “public benefit and sustainable value.”118 Some benefit corporations
are legally required to consider and benefit all stakeholders, including workers.
These too, even if they are not fully worker-owned coöperatives, can serve the
goals of mutuality.
An example of a benefit corporation is King Arthur Flour, America’s oldest
flour company, founded in 1790. King Arthur is a certified B Corp (certified and
evaluated as to social and environmental performance) and commits itself to a
“triple bottom line” for “people, planet, and profit.” It also is required to do a B
Impact Assessment to show and certify its success toward these missions
(independently done).119
Prior to 1996, King Arthur was a regular corporation run by Frank and Brinna
Sands.120 When the Sands began thinking about retiring, they decided to sell their
company to its employees through an employee-stock ownership plan (ESOP). In
an ESOP, an ESOP trust is formed as a legal entity to hold shares of stock on behalf
of the employees of a company. The ESOP trust is funded entirely by the
company.121 The trust gains cash through profit or loans, and then uses that funding
to acquire shares from the owner (the value is appraised independently).122 The
trust then allocates the shares it has bought to employees. So in effect, employees
gain stock without a cash outlay,123 and the owner is paid out over a period of time,
often through a promissory note.124 In effect, ESOPs function a lot like retirement
plans such as 401(k)s, but there is one enormous difference: The company fully
funds the ESOP and the employees do not contribute financially.125 For King Arthur
specifically, “after the first year of employment, all workers who log more than 800
hours a year, including season and part-time laborers, are eligible for the employee
stock ownership program, or ESOP.”126 According to Joseph Blasi of Rutgers
University, co-author of The Citizen’s Share: Reducing Inequality in the 21st Century,
many family business-owners are drawn to ESOPs to promote the best interests of
their workers.127
This has proven successful for King Arthur, which has experienced major
growth since transforming itself into an employee-owned business. It began
distributing products outside of New England in the late 1990s and has now
reached over $100 million in annual sales and sends over 2,000 King Arthur
products to grocery stores.128
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Retailer or Purchaser Coöperatives | Ace Hardware
Another form of coöperation consists of independent retailers working
together through a coöperative arrangement to help each other and leverage their
numbers. A good illustration is Ace Hardware. Ace began as a wholesale group in
the 1920s. A number of Chicago hardware retailers banded together to pool their
purchasing power and to buy directly from manufacturers, in order to avoid having
to go through a middleman for hardware merchandise to sell.129 The group formally
incorporated their business as “Ace Stores” in 1928 and opened a warehouse in
1929. Membership expanded to 41 retailers by 1934. By 1969, they had opened
distribution centers in Georgia and California, expanding operations to the South
and West. 130
Originally, Ace Stores operated as a conventional wholesale group. When the
co-founder and long-term president Richard Hesse retired in 1973, he sold the
enterprise to its member-dealers to create a dealer-owned hardware coöperative,
which is its current corporate structure.131
Today, Ace Hardware consists of hardware stores that are part of the
coöperative in a franchise-like model with Ace Hardware providing shared
capabilities and brand recognition.132 Member-retailers fall under one of two
programs for Ace Hardware support: “Ace Branded” stores or “Individually
Branded” stores.133 The former account for 91% of the national network, operating
under the Ace brand and entitled to all services and benefits (including marketing).
“Individually Branded” stores represent about 9% of the national domestic network
for Ace Hardware. They rely on Ace’s product assortment and product pricing, but
do not participate in marketing programs (usually, they can leverage their brand
name recognition in their local communities). Ace also now has a separate legal
entity (AWH) to sell to non-member retailers, formed in 2014.134
As a matter of corporate finance, Ace Hardware divides its membership
structure into Class A and Class C stocks—each Class A stock is $1,000 per share
and Class C stock is $100 per share—with Class A stockholders having voting
rights.135 In order to be a member of Ace Hardware, a retailer must purchase stock,
and based on that, they will receive patronage distributions that are based on the
volume of merchandise they have purchased. Stock is sold only to approved
retailers of hardware who apply for membership. Initial membership requires
buying one share of Class A stock plus 40 shares of Class C stock, so a total
investment of $5,ooo. For each additional store location, members require an
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additional 50 shares of Class C stock, but no additional Class A stock (as a way to
limit dilution of voting parity between retailers within the coöperative).
As of year-end 2018, Ace Hardware reported $5.7 billion in annual revenues,
with net income of $128 million.136 Ace Hardware had a total store count of
5,253.137 At this point, according to Ace, about three quarters of American homes
and businesses are “located within 15 minutes of speedy-sized Ace stores.”138
Research suggests that, at a general level, many members of purchasing
coöperatives find them to be a compelling strategy to manage supply chain costs,
often resulting in “2 to 5 percent cost savings.”139 The competitive advantage of a
coöperative as against other purchasing structures is that “a true purchasing
cooperative can provide a monetary return to its members in the form of patronage
dividends.”140 For Ace Hardware, the purchasing coöperative means that the
member stores are its only shareholders, which gives them an advantage over “big
box” retailers such as Lowe’s and Home Depot.141 Also, there tends to be high
satisfaction among members. At Ace, apparently, the overall satisfaction of
affiliates has been high: more than 90% surveyed “expressed strong pride in Ace”
and 80% of retailers rated overall satisfaction as 8 or higher out of 10.142

The Resilience of Coöperation
Across these different sectors, coöperationist enterprises have proven
resilient, especially during economic downturns and despite the favored treatment
of capital.
In the financial sector, credit unions entered the financial crisis of 2007-2008
in stronger shape than their for-profit peers and came out of the recession stronger
as well. Before 2007, coöperative financial institutions were reported to have
“comparable or slightly higher earnings than investor-owned banks and achieved
higher return on equity,” and in this sense, entered the crisis with a “stronger
capital base than their competitors.”143 In Europe, coöperative banks only suffered
7% of all banking industry asset write-downs and losses throughout the financial
crisis, despite having 20% of the market. In large part, this was due to their limited
exposure to subprime mortgages and investment activity.144 In the United
Kingdom, mutual building societies suffered minimal losses.145
In fact, in the face of financial crisis, financial coöperatives often see an
increase in “almost every facet of their business.”146 They see an increase in assets
and deposits: for instance, 516 credit unions in Canada saw a six-month increase in
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assets in the second quarter of 2008; the Credit Union National Association in the
United States saw deposits in credit unions increase by 10% in 2009; Rabobank in
the Netherlands saw its share of loans increase to 42% of the total market.147 They
see an increase in the volume of lending: for instance, loans by credit unions in the
United States increased from $539 billion in 2007 to $575 billion in 2008, while
8,300 U.S. for-profit banks saw loans outstanding decrease from $7.91 trillion to
$7.88 trillion.148 They see an increase in membership levels: for instance, in the
United States, membership in credit unions rose to 90 million in 2008 from 85
million in 2004; Raiffeisen Switzerland had record growth in 2008 with 7.3% new
members.149 And they offer better interest rates: in the United States, savings and
credit coöperatives have better rates compared to their peers; favorable lending
rates were also a major impetus for Brazilian owners and low-income families to
form a savings and credit coöperative.150
Worker coöperatives have a record of actually growing during recessions.
According to Johnston Birchall, author of “The Performance of Member-Owned
Businesses Since the Financial Crisis of 2008,” in The Oxford Handbook of Mutual,
Co-Operative, and Co-Owned Business: “Since the late nineteenth century, in
countries where there are strong worker co-operatives, these have tended to
increase in number during recessions, both as new start-ups and takeovers of ailing
businesses.”151 As evidence for this, Birchall notes that the worker coöperative
sector in France grew by more than 263 coöperatives in 2013 (an increase of 17%
since 2009) and had a survival rate of 77% versus 65% for conventional firms.152 In
addition, the “level of indebtedness of worker co-ops was lower than that of
comparable enterprises,” and the job losses were less significant (e.g. in Spain, 6.4%
vs. 11.9% in other types of enterprises).153 In the United States, in the decade after
the 2008 financial crisis, the sheer number of worker-owned coöperatives almost
doubled.154
Overall, the CECOP-CICOPA Europe (International Organization of Industrial
and Service Cooperatives, Europe) has conducted annual surveys that highlight the
resilience of coöperatives by contrast to conventional enterprises. Coöperatives
demonstrate lower job losses and failures: in Italy in 2011, for instance, 68% of
coöperatives kept the same employment number, 18% grew, and only 13%
contracted.155 In France, the number of coöperatives increased throughout the
2008 crisis: In 2005, there were 1,612 worker coöperatives and that number
continued to rise through 2010, ending with 1,822 coöperatives.156 Bruno Roelants
and his colleagues offer several compelling hypotheses to explain the resilience of
coöperationist enterprises.157
28
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3702010

29
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3702010

Chapter 2. Beyond Capitalism and Communism
To move forward toward coöperation, the first and most important step will be to
leave behind the misleading debate between capitalism on the one hand and
communism, socialism, and anarchism on the other. That centuries-old debate is
pure ideology—nothing more than illusions masquerading as economic and
political science.
American capitalism may look and feel like it is all about “free commerce”
and “private enterprise,” but in fact the entire system rests wholly on the
government’s promise—and track record—of rescuing private corporations in case
of economic and financial collapse. Without the federal government backstop,
without the promise and reality of bailing out private corporations during
depressions and recessions, the fragile and deeply indebted structure of American
capitalism would collapse in a split second—among other things, foreign investors
would withdraw their capital and the American markets would implode. The full
ideology of American capitalism serves simply to mask the fact that the entire
system is a house of cards that serves to funnel wealth to the richest and most
privileged Americans. American capitalism must be understood, in truth, as a statist
form of economic redistribution.
Really-existing communism is also purely ideological. It claims to place
everything in common, when in fact it monopolizes ownership in the hands of a
centralized state apparatus or political party or faction. Any and all allocations and
distributions of goods and wealth are the magnanimous (more often self-serving)
decisions of a centralized bureaucracy or autocracy. By the same token, socialism
is really nothing more than the state ownership of the means of production, which
produces the same self-serving elitism, and anarchism is, well, an imaginary.
The centuries-old debate between capitalism, communism, and socialism is
utterly useless today because it masks the actual allocation of proprietary interests
and the resulting real distributions of material possessions. It rests on imagined
ideal types that are misleading and pure illusions. They need to be unmasked and
relegated to the twentieth century.
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The Misleading Label “Capitalism”
The label “capitalism” itself was always a misnomer, coined paradoxically by
its critics in the nineteenth century. The term misleadingly suggests that there is
such a thing as “capital” that inherently functions in certain ways and is governed
by stable economic laws of its own. That’s an illusion, however. Capital is just an
artifact shaped by laws and politics—in effect, constructed by the state. Its code is
entirely man-made. There are no “laws” of capital. And in truth, we do not live
today in a system in which “capital” or “free enterprise” dictate our economic
circumstances. Instead, we live in a system that should be called “tournament
dirigisme”: a type of state-directed tournament, or gladiator sport, where our
political leaders bestow spoils on those with wealth and privilege—not surprisingly,
given the legacy of slavery in this country, the white upper-class.
The provenance of a misleading term
The use of the term “capitalism” dates to the early nineteenth century. The
notion of capitalism as an economic system grounded on capital investments traces
to that period in both French and English. The OED traces the first use in English to
1833 in the Standard, and offers the following comparisons:
Compare French capitalisme possession of capital (1753), economic
system
based
on
capital
investment
(1842),
German Kapitalismus possession of capital (1787 or earlier),
economic system (K. Marx 1863 or earlier).158
Of course, the term “capitalist,” with a “t,” had an earlier provenance, also
related to the term “capital,” which itself was in usage in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries. Its etymology (“capitalist”) traces to the
“French capitaliste (noun) person subject to a capital tax (in the Netherlands)
(1678), investor (mid 18th cent.), (adjective) of or relating to capital (1755 in an
early use of uncertain precise meaning), engaged in investing capital (1832), that
advocates capitalism (1869), itself after Dutch capitalist (noun) person subject to a
capital tax (1621), rich person (1683), advocate of capitalism (late 19th cent.).”159
Along these lines, in English, the term “capitalist” was used beginning in 1774,
referring to the Dutch wealthy subject and to “capitation”; and its date stamp in
English has to be compared with the “German Capitalist investor, moneylender
(1673 with reference to the Netherlands), rich person (1687), advocate of
capitalism (now Kapitalist), Italian capitalista investor (1769, rare in early use).”160
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For its more political economic meaning, though, we must turn to the early
to mid-nineteenth century and, for the most part, to the socialist critics of
capitalism. This is ironic, since it is in this usage of the term that “capitalism”
became reified and naturalized—as if “capital,” as a thing, functions economically,
when in fact it is nothing but a set of crystalized government rules of economic
redistribution. Capitalism, in other words, and tragically, was turned into a
naturalized object by its critics.
But so-called capitalism is not primarily about the object “capital.” Rather, it
is about government privileging returns on investments with more favorable tax
rates, government protecting capital investors by bailing them out during financial
crises, and government encouraging and underwriting the stock markets.
In this sense, capitalism is really about the state’s control over the
redistribution of proprietary interests. It is a form of dirigisme that favors individuals
who privately hold capital as property—it is not just a regime of private property.
Capitalism, as an economic regime, is the product of government and elite
control of the mechanisms of redistribution: bailouts during crises that allow
managers to enrich themselves during good times, without making reserves or
taking risk into account, because they are bailed out during bad times; rules of
capital accumulation that make it easy for those with wealth to hoard more than
others and pass it on to their heirs; wide-ranging actions (from judicial decisions to
intelligence gathering shared with top officials to selective club admission) that give
those with capital the knowledge and ability to capitalize on their wealth. By bailing
out during crises, especially, the government allows capital holders to pillage in
good times and get rescued in bad.
One of the greatest problems with retaining the term “capitalism” is that it
suggests that “capital” and private enterprise have certain laws surrounding them;
that they function naturally in certain ways. Even Marx naturalized capital too
much—not paying sufficient attention to the political dimension of bailouts and
handouts. This was facilitated by the very nomenclature of “capitalism.”
This type of economic regime should no longer be called “capitalist,” but
rather a term that has government and elite control and redistribution at its heart.
It is closer to the “state capitalism” that we attribute to China; but again, the term
“capitalism” in “state capitalism” is a red herring. All the terms that quickly come
to mind are lacking: corporate welfarism does not afford enough attention to the
centrality of this welfare system, as if welfare is just something in addition, when
in fact it is the whole system; cronyism gets at the corruption of it all and its elitism,
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but is too demeaning; profiteering, like the pirates of past, captures something
about booty and stolen profit, and has an interesting relationship to state sanction
and complicity, but the relationship to the state is backwards because it was the
pirates who were more in charge and only later licensed.
I would propose instead that we call it “tournament dirigisme” to capture
both the element of state control (dirigisme) and the way in which the state
distributes the spoils. In the United States, we live in an economic system of
“tournament dirigisme” that is all about extraction of wealth and redistribution to
the wealthiest—the whitest and most privileged.
The metaphor of extraction is important, as Saskia Sassen has emphasized.161
Our tournament dirigisme seeks to extract wealth from the enterprise. The capital
investors have one guiding interest: to extract a profit. They are not really
concerned about growth and equity, nor about other persons affiliated with the
enterprise. They want a good return on their investment. The metaphor here is
gold mining or mining more generally. Our tournament dirigisme is an extractive
process that seeks to extract capital as wealth and leave behind the detritus. Like
an old mine, it then abandons the space of extraction. It does not care. All it wants
is the profit.
There is, of course, a spectrum of extraction. At the most extreme end, there
are vulture capitalists who buy failing enterprises because they are worth more sold
as assets than they are as ongoing enterprises. That is pure extraction. Investors
like T. Boone Pickens or Carl Icahn, who used to be referred to as takeover artists
or corporate raiders, often took the strategy of buying companies literally to extract
capital—more capital than they paid—by breaking up the company and selling its
assets. But even in less extreme forms, extraction is at the heart of the enterprise:
to mine a higher return on investment than others, or than the market, by treating
and working others to the bone. Otherwise, there is no comparative enrichment.
Marx’s critique of capitalist modes of production focused so much on labor
and the exploitation of workers that it did not sufficiently account for the central
role of the state in directing distributions in favor of capital holders. Marx too had
a fetish for capital, for surplus-value, for the commodity that is our labor. He
replicated that objectification and turned it into the idea of a regime of
“capitalism.” “It is often said,” as Foucault reminds us in his lectures on the Birth of
Biopolitics, “that there is no theory of power in Marx, that the theory of the state
is inadequate, and that it really is time to produce it.”162 Perhaps Marx did not need
one at that time. Perhaps he had sufficient work to do to understand the political
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economy of industrial production. But we certainly do today because so-called
“capitalism” is nothing more than dirigisme now.
The problem, in any event, traces further back. Adam Smith set out to
analyze the economic wellbeing of a nation or of society as a whole—the wealth of
a nation; but he developed instead a magical theory in which economic
development and the division of labor ultimately benefited the workers, even the
lowest on the social order. For Smith, the wealth of nations lifted every boat. Marx
was right to call this “bourgeois economics.” And while Marx took an opposing
viewpoint—that of the factory worker or tradesman—he may well have focused
too much on labor, as Max Horkheimer, Axel Honneth and others demonstrate. In
this, Marx too gave too much autonomy to capital.
Neither Smith nor Marx, paradoxically, paid sufficient attention to the state.
With the New Deal, but certainly with the bailouts of the Great Recession of 2008
and the COVID-19 pandemic, we live in a more transparent age in which we can see
the central and key role of the state.

The Reality of Tournament Dirigisme
To get a sense of what we are really dealing with when we talk about
“capitalism,” it is worth taking a look at the 2020 government bailout.
In the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak and the resulting
economic crash, President Donald Trump signed on March 27, 2020, a $2.2 trillion
package titled the “Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act” or the
“CARES Act.” The legislation flew through Congress and was passed without an
impact assessment by the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”). Few legislators had
the time to read it before it was signed into law.
To give an idea of the scale of the package, the total national debt of the
United States stood at $23,535,039,888,496.42—essentially $23.5 trillion—on the
day the president signed the CARES Act.163 So the bailout represented almost 10%
of our enormous national debt. Even that underestimates the size of the measure
because the national debt has grown so fast in the past decades. The total national
debt stood at only $5 trillion in 1996. It doubled to about $10 trillion by 2008, and
then doubled again to about $20 trillion in 2017. With such a high national debt
today, the CARES Act may seem like a relatively small contribution to the country’s
indebtedness—but that is merely an artifact of the colossal size of the national debt
itself.
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To give a better idea, the size of the CARES Act is about 2.5 times the federal
government’s financial deficit for the entire fiscal year 2019. The federal deficit for
2019 was approximately $984 billion—so almost a trillion dollars—up from $779
billion for 2018 and $666 billion for 2017.164 Alternatively, the CARES Act is about
half the size of the entire federal budget for fiscal 2019—from October 1, 2018 to
September 30, 2019—which reached $4.45 trillion. Yet another comparative
measure: the 2009 bailout was about $800 billion, so only almost a third of the
CARES Act. In other words, we are talking about a gigantic bailout.
The main components of the CARES Act include:
• $500 billion in government support to corporations (of which $25 billion
may support passenger airlines, $4 billion cargo airlines, and $17 billion
companies related to national security) (Title IV) 165
• $350 billion in government support to small businesses for loans to cover
worker payroll and other expenses (Title I)166; it seems as if these loans can
be forgiven167
• Another $350 billion in government support to small businesses,168 plus
another about $40 billion for special loans169
• $150 billion in government support (“payments”) to states, tribal
governments, and local governments (Title V)170
• $100 billion in government support to hospitals
• $45 billion for a disaster relief fund171
• $32 billion in government support to airline workers for wages and benefits
• $10 billion in government support (loans) to U.S. Post Office172
• $10 billion in government grants in aid to airports173
• $3.5 billion in government support to states to support childcare facilities
and to universities to support federal work-study jobs for students
In addition, the CARES Act provided $500 billion in government support to
low-income households, which was distributed through $1,200 checks with a
signed letter from President Trump. There are also lots of smaller grants in the Act,
including the following: “$100 million for additional rural broadband and $150
million for arts and humanities grants to bring cultural programming to Americans
stuck at home. It would increase funding for domestic violence shelters and
hotlines and set aside $425 million to deal with mental health and substance abuse
disorders related to the pandemic. $400 million would become available to protect
and expand voting for the 2020 election cycle.”174
***
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For present purposes, let’s focus on the $500 billion in government loans to
corporations—as well as the additional $25 billion for the airline industry.
According to the New York Times, the $500 billion “include $425 billion for
the Federal Reserve to leverage for loans to help broad groups of distressed
companies and $75 billion for industry-specific loans to airlines and other hard-hit
sectors.” Of that, $25 billion in grants for the airline companies, with possible equity
interests; plus $17 billion for direct loans to “companies related to America’s
national security.” There are certain strings attached—but most of them can be
unknotted and are temporary.175
The treatment of airline companies is particularly telling.
The Airline Bailouts
First, Title IV of the CARES Act is titled the ‘‘Coronavirus Economic
Stabilization Act of 2020’’ and provides for $500 billion in loans and investments to
American corporations. Of that sum, the Act provides that “$25,000,000,000 shall
be available to make loans and loan guarantees for passenger air carriers,” and
another $4 billion to cargo air carriers.176 These seem to only include loans and loan
guarantees, and not other investments. The loans are not to exceed 5 years, and
will entail certain restrictions on the corporations, namely:
• “until the date 12 months after the date the loan or loan guarantee is no
longer outstanding, neither the eligible business nor any affiliate of the
eligible business may purchase an equity security that is listed on a national
securities exchange of the eligible business or any parent company of the
eligible business, except to the extent required under a contractual
obligation in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act;
• “until the date 12 months after the date the loan or loan guarantee is no
longer outstanding, the eligible business shall not pay dividends or make
other capital distributions with respect to the common stock of the eligible
business;
• “until September 30, 2020, the eligible business shall maintain its
employment levels as of March 24, 2020, to the extent practicable, and in
any case shall not reduce its employment levels by more than 10 percent
from the levels on such date”177
For any of these loans or loan guarantees, the government must also receive,
for publicly traded corporations, a warrant or equity interest, and, for non-publicly
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traded corporations, a warrant, equity interest, or senior debt instrument.178 These
loans supposedly cannot be forgiven.179
Second, Subtitle B of that Title IV, titled “Air Carrier Worker Support,”
provides for another $32 billion dollars to the airline industry by way of payments
to workers in the industry. This is broken down, specifically, into $25 billion for
passenger airline companies, $4 billion for cargo airline companies, and $3 billion
for airline industry contractors, such as catering, baggage handling, ticketing, and
aircraft cleaning. More specifically, the Act provides as follows:
To preserve aviation jobs and compensate air carrier industry workers,
the Secretary [of the Treasury] shall provide financial assistance that shall
exclusively be used for the continuation of payment of employee wages,
salaries, and benefits to—
(1) passenger air carriers, in an aggregate amount up to
$25,000,000,000;
(2) cargo air carriers, in the aggregate amount up to
$4,000,000,000; and
(3) contractors,
$3,000,000,000.180

in

an

aggregate

amount

up

to

Here too there are some temporary strings attached. Airlines may not
furlough workers during the grant, and there are some restrictions on executive
pay. Moreover, to “protect taxpayers,” the Treasury department may seek equity
in the companies. According to the Act, “The Secretary may receive warrants,
options, preferred stock, debt securities, notes, or other financial instruments
issued by recipients of financial assistance under this subtitle which, in the sole
determination of the Secretary, provide appropriate compensation to the Federal
Government for the provision of the financial assistance.”181
So, for airlines, that amounts to $29 billion in loans and $29 billion in
payments to workers, for a total of $58 billion.
On April 14, 2020, the Treasury Department and several airlines reached
agreement on the terms of the bailout. The department indicated that the
following airlines would participate in the payroll support program—i.e. the grants
from the federal government to pay airlines workers: Alaska Airlines, Allegiant Air,
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Frontier Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, JetBlue
Airways, United Airlines, SkyWest Airlines and Southwest Airlines.
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According to the New York Times, “American Airlines said it would receive
$5.8 billion as part of the deal, with more than $4 billion in grants and the remaining
$1.7 billion as a low-interest loan. The funds are intended to be used to pay
employees, and the airlines that take them are prohibited from major staffing or
pay cuts through September. American Airlines plans to separately apply for a
nearly $4.8 billion loan from the department as well.”182 Southwest Airlines said it
would seek $2.2 billion in grant moneys and $1 billion in a low-interest loan.
Now here is where it gets interesting: the associated “warrants.” With regard
to the $1 billion loan to Southwest, the Treasury Department is expected to get
only $2.6 million in warrants, which can be used to buy an equity stake. The Times
reports:
The administration had spent weeks haggling with the airlines over
the terms of the bailout, with Mr. Mnuchin pushing the airlines to
agree to repay 30 percent of the money over a period of five years.
The Treasury Department also has been seeking warrants to
purchase stock in the companies that take money. Airlines have
complained that Treasury was effectively turning the grants into
loans by requiring repayment.
Last week, the Treasury Department said that it would not require
airlines that receive up to $100 million in bailout money to give the
government equity stakes or other compensation. The government
had received over 200 applications from American airlines seeking
payroll support and Treasury said that the majority of those were
asking for less than $10 million.183
So, the corporations are (1) resisting repaying any of the grants and (2) trying
to get out from under the equity stakes by asking for grants in multiple lower-level
applications.
What is clear is that the corporations are getting significant amounts of
money compared to their profits years earlier. And the restrictions, if any, are
temporary. As soon as the grant period is over, the corporations will begin laying
off their employees. American Airlines already threatened at the end of August
2020 to lay off 19,000 workers.184
Let’s continue with American Airlines. American made profits of $7.6 billion
in 2015—up from about $500 million in 2007 and less than $250 million the
previous year. As Tim Wu argues in the New York Times, it used most of those
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profits to shore up its stock price. “From 2014 to 2020, in an attempt to increase its
earnings per share,” Wu explains, “American spent more than $15 billion buying
back its own stock.”185 American Airlines, though, was not the only one. This was
an industry-wide phenomenon. As Wu notes, the airline industry as a whole
“collectively spent more than $45 billion on stock buybacks over the past eight
years.”186 Other industries as well engaged in these types of buybacks even when
the conditions looked risky. “As recently as March 3 of this year, with the crisis
already beginning, the Hilton hotel chain put $2 billion into a stock buyback.”187
So, while American Airlines is now getting bailed out, it spent its profits
earlier buying back stock as a way to increase the capital holder’s value. In other
words, the airline was extracting value during good times and getting bailed out by
the federal government—and our tax dollars—during bad times.
And it is not just the airlines that are extracting profit from the pandemic.
Of the other $454 billion earmarked for the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, these funds can be used not just for loans and loan guarantees, but also
for “other investments.” What these include are the following:
“to make loans and loan guarantees to, and other investments in,
programs or facilities established by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System for the purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system
that supports lending to eligible businesses, States, or municipalities by—
(A) purchasing obligations or other interests directly from
issuers of such obligations or other interests;
(B) purchasing obligations or other interests in secondary
markets or otherwise; or
(C) making loans, including loans or other advances secured by
collateral.188
Some requirements apply regarding the prohibition on loan forgiveness—
although those too may go by the wayside.189 And this nevertheless represents a
huge amount of money that can be invested directly into publicly traded
corporations to protect shareholder value.
Hidden Jackpots in the CARES Act
And then, there are hidden treasures for the wealthy in a bailout bill like this
one which runs through Congress with lightning speed—allowing the majority, in
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this case the Republican majority in the Senate, to sneak into the bill beneficial tax
changes for the wealthy that they had previously been trying to get passed.
One such provision temporarily suspends a limitation, passed in 2017 as part
of the massive Republican tax code revisions, on the amount of deductions to
nonbusiness income (e.g. capital gains) that owners of businesses that are
established as “pass-through” entities can claim as a way to reduce their taxes
owed.190 The provision effectively amended section 172(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code, which deals with “net operating loss deductions” for all kinds of entities,
including farmers, insurance companies, businesses and taxpayers other than
corporations.191 The section that effectuates changes is itself innocuous and
imperceptible, using language that no lay person would suspect of having much
impact. It is the kind of language that starts:
(1) IN GENERAL.—The first sentence of section 172(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ‘‘an amount equal to’’ and all
that follows and inserting ‘‘an amount equal to—
‘‘(1) in the case of a taxable year beginning before January 1, 2021, the
aggregate of the net operating loss carryovers to such year, plus the net
operating loss carrybacks to such year, and
‘‘(2) in the case of a taxable year beginning after December 31, 2020,
the sum of—
‘‘(A) the aggregate amount of net operating losses arising in
taxable years beginning before January 1, 2018, carried to such taxable
year, plus
‘‘(B) the lesser of—
‘‘(i) the aggregate amount of net operating losses arising
in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017, carried to
such taxable year, or
‘‘(ii) 80 percent of the excess (if any) of—
‘‘(I) taxable income computed without regard to
the deductions under this section and sections 199A and
250, over
‘‘(II) the amount determined under subparagraph
192

(A).’’
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The nonpartisan congressional body, the Joint Committee on Taxation
(“JCT”), headed by Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Representative Richard
Neal (D-Mass), issued a report on March 26, 2020, estimating some of the revenue
effects of the tax provisions included in the CARES Act. 193 It estimated that the
amendment to section 172(a) of the IRC, as it affects tax payers other than
corporations, would reduce tax revenues by $74.3 billion in 2020, with continued
reductions over the next decade, resulting in total revenue losses over the period
2020-2030 of $169.6 billion. In addition, the “Modifications for net operating losses
(‘NOLs’)” (corresponding to the “increase taxable income limitation for net
operating loss from 80 percent to 100 percent of taxable income, and allow 5 year
generally NOL carryback”) was estimated to generate $80 billion in lost tax revenue
in 2020.194
In a subsequent letter dated April 9, 2020, responding to an informational
request from Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and Representative Lloyd
Doggett (D-Texas), the JTC broke down the likely distributional effect of the tax
change by income category, revealing that the tax reductions would
disproportionately benefit the wealthy.195 In its table, the JTC documented that
81.8% of the total reduction in tax liability of $86 billion in 2020 (in other words
$70.3 billion in reduced tax revenues) would likely benefit those with an income
over $1 million. The table also revealed that there will be approximately 43,000
returns filed by taxpayers with income over $1 million. In effect, this suggests that
taxpayers in that highest tax bracket (over $1 million in income) will receive on
average a tax bonanza of $1.63 million.196
This represents, as Senator Whitehouse and Representative Doggett state,
“a massive windfall for a small group of wealthy taxpayers from a Republican
provision in the coronavirus relief bill.”197 As they emphasize, in fact, 95% of those
who will likely benefit from the tax change make over $200,000.198 Representative
Lloyd Doggett put it in these terms: “For those earning $1 million annually, a tax
break buried in the recent coronavirus relief legislation is so generous that its total
cost is more than total new funding for all hospitals in America and more than the
total provided to all state and local governments. Someone wrongly seized on this
health emergency to reward ultrarich beneficiaries, likely including the Trump
family, with a tax loophole not available to middle class families.”199
All in all, this minor tax provision hidden in the CARES Act will reduce tax
revenues—in other words, increase the wealth predominantly of the wealthy—by
an estimated total of $195 billion over ten years according to the JCT. 200 That far
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outweighs much of the benefits of the CARES Act for those ordinary citizens getting
a $1,200 check.
***
One need not look further than to the CARES Act—or, for that matter, the bailout
of 2008—to realize that all the talk about the American system of free enterprise
is a smoke screen for a system of state control that funnels wealth primarily to the
wealthiest and most privileged, which in this country corresponds to the white
upper-class.
There is no better demonstration of this than the behavior of the American
stock markets in the six months following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The economic news could not have been worse. Unemployment reached
depression levels. Economic growth dropped precipitously. And the stock markets
hit record highs for months. In March and April 2020, over thirty million Americans
filed first-time unemployment claims, pushing unemployment to its highest levels
since the Great Depression. Despite that, the U.S. stock markets recorded in April
their best month since 1987201; after an initial shock, the markets rallied steadily,
rising over 30% since their lows in late March. Dire economic news continued to
pound the country for the following four months. In the second quarter of 2020,
the American economy lost a third of its steam, with quarterly economic growth
(GDP) declining at an annual rate of 32.9%—the worst quarter in at least 145
years.202 And yet, the S&P had its best month in August 2020 since 1986, and the
NASDAQ since 2000.203 The Dow Jones rose above 29,000 in September 2020 to
reach record highs from before the pandemic.204
Most economists were puzzled and offered fanciful daily explanations.205
Even Paul Krugman had little to say, suggesting that “Investors are buying stocks in
part because they have nowhere else to go.”206 But the reasons are obvious and
there is no wonder the markets defied the economic crash: the pandemic is a boon
for capital extraction. For the markets, there is nothing like a good crisis when the
right people are in power. It provides the perfect opportunity for more capital
extraction. Philip Mirowski wrote tellingly about this during the last debacle—the
financial meltdown of 2008—under the moniker “Never let a serious crisis go to
waste.”207 Now too, the Faustian logic is clear.
First, President Trump and the Republican Senators have made it crystal clear
that they have the backs of the large-cap corporations no matter how bad things
get.208 By strengthening the largest corporations now, the CARES Act will help them
weed out their smaller competitors and facilitate monopolistic practices later. After
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the pandemic, the large-cap corporations will be poised to reap extractive profits,
while most small businesses and mom-and-pop stores will be out of business.
Second, the sunset provisions on the bailout restrictions will allow
shareholders and managers to enrich themselves when an economic recovery
eventually happens, again without ever needing to build reserves because they
know they will be bailed out next time as well. As Tim Wu details, these recurring
bailouts have allowed wealthy managers to pillage in good times—through stock
buybacks and exorbitant executive pay—and get rescued in bad.209 This too
enhances market value while extracting capital for the wealthy.
Third, Trump has sapped any momentum toward universal health care by
promising financial exceptions for coronavirus-related health care costs. These
COVID-19 carve outs may protect the Republicans from backlash in the November
2020 elections. After it’s all over, the less fortunate will continue to be ravaged by
ordinary cancers and poverty-related diseases without any coverage, to the
financial benefit of private insurance and corporate and wealthier taxpayers.210
Fourth, the pandemic is disproportionately decimating the most vulnerable
populations: the elderly, the poor, the uninsured, the incarcerated, and persons of
color. The racial imbalance is unconscionable211: the coronavirus mortality rate for
African Americans is almost three times higher than the mortality rate for whites.212
The rates of infection in prison and jails are also horrifying.213 The populations at
risk are disproportionately older and poorer, so on Medicare and Medicaid. Some
refer to this as “culling the herd.”214 Market investors can expect that social security
will be less of a drag on the economy in the future.
Fifth, the Republicans have been able to secret into the bailouts tax bonanzas
for millionaires. The earlier provision just discussed—suspending the limitation on
the amount of deductions to nonbusiness income that owners of businesses
established as pass-through entities can claim as a way to reduce their taxes
owed—will disproportionately benefit about 43,000 taxpayers in the highest tax
bracket (over $1 million in income) who will receive an average windfall of $1.63
million per filer.215
The stock markets have become the mirror of this ugly truth of capital
extraction. Michel Foucault presciently observed, back in 1979, that markets are
the touchstone of truth in neoliberal times.216 And the ugly truth that they reveal
today is that the pandemic is a goldmine for large-cap corporations, institutional
investors, and the wealthiest. I once overheard a New York real estate tycoon
talking about the land grab in the Adirondacks in the 1930s and commenting
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“Wasn’t the Great Depression grand!” Institutional investors must feel the same
way about the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sadly, one can hardly expect that much difference in a Democratic
administration, especially one that is equally beholden to Wall Street and wealthy
donors. The last two—those of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama—avidly embraced
neoliberal policies such as workfare for the unemployed and welfare for the
corporate elite. The Paulson and Geithner bailouts of 2008 were the model for
today’s.
None of this is new, and it replicates fully the experience of 2008. As
Mirowski demonstrates well, neoliberal extractive capitalism was strengthened,
rather than weakened, by the 2007-2008 crisis. The proponents of neoliberalism
persevered, undaunted, redoubled their efforts to capture the economics
profession, pulled the wool over people’s eyes, found ways to co-op protest
movements like Occupy, and came through with policy proposals and responses
that outflanked the left-leaning neoclassical economists. In the process, they
extracted even more capital from the economy. As Mirowski writes, “The tenacity
of neoliberal doctrines that might have otherwise been refuted at every turn since
2008 has to be rooted in the extent to which a kind of “folk” or “everyday”
neoliberalism has sunk so deeply into the cultural unconscious that even a few rude
shocks can’t begin to bring it to the surface long enough to provoke discomfort.” 217
“They know what it means to never let a serious crisis go to waste.”218
It is time for the proponents of coöperation to learn this lesson.
It is time to stop talking about “capitalism,” perhaps even “neoliberalism,”
and refer instead to the system of tournament dirigisme.
The only way forward, now, is a genuine transformation that replaces our
existing dirigiste regime with coöperative, mutualist, and non-profit enterprises.

The Problem with “Communism”
The term “communism” is no less misleading than the term “capitalism.”
Derived from the root “common,” communism suggests the abolition of private
property and the creation of a common shared by all. But in really-existing
communist regimes, there has never been such a “common,” instead a centralized
state- or party- driven allocation of possessory interests. Here too, the
nomenclature is entirely deceiving.
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The term “communism” itself also traces to the same period, the early
nineteenth century. Understood as the political and economic system that
abolishes private property, the term “communism” started to be used in English in
1840, with an entry in the New York Spectator from August 1840. The term
“Communism” with a capital “C” associated with Marx and the proletarian
overthrow of the bourgeois class, began to be used in English in 1850.219 Regarding
its French usage, the OED notes:
The coinage of the French term has been variously attributed to
Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve (1804–69), French poet, novelist,
and critic (in a letter of 3rd August 1840: see C. A. SainteBeuve Correspondance génerale III. 332), Étienne Cabet (1788–
1856), French philosopher (E. Cabet Histoire populaire de la
révolution française IV. (1840) 331), and Théophile Thoré (1807–
69), French art critic (T. Thoré La verité sur le parti
démocratique (1840) 27). All three seem to have arrived at the term
ind ependently in 1840. Compare also quot. 1848 and quot. 1840 at
sense 1. For a full discussion of the origins and development of
French communisme (and related terms), see Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe III. at Kommunismus.220
The term “communist” in English, with a “t” at the end, has a similar time
stamp, around 1840, with or without a capital “C.” Here, the term was used
previously in the late eighteenth century in French with different connotations, but
essentially traces to the mid-nineteenth for its current usage:
French communiste was used earlier (1769) with reference to
participants in the collective possession of land (mortmain). The
French term was also used for other kinds of collective ownership
in the late 18th cent., e.g. with reference to the right of pasturing
animals on common land (1789). It was also used from at least the
1830s to refer to adherents of François-Noël Babeuf (1760–97),
militant French revolutionary. Coinage of the term in the sense
‘advocate or adherent of the theory of communism’ has been
variously attributed to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–65), French
editor, politician, and social theorist (P.-J. Proudhon Qu'est-ce que
la propriété? (1840) 326) and Étienne Cabet (1788–1856), French
philosopher (É. Cabet Comment je suis communiste (1840)). Both
seem to have arrived at the term independently in 1840. For a full
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discussion
of
the
origins
and
development
of
French communiste (and related terms) see Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe III. at Kommunismus.221
But this animating ideal of collective or communal ownership of property—
of the abolition of private property in favor of the “common”—has never been
realized at a national level, other than through state nationalization of the modes
of production. The laudable ideal of living together in common can work well for a
commune, but does not scale up to the level of a large economy like the United
States, the State of New York, or even New York City.
The problem is principally one of scaling. As soon as the communal body
grows beyond the size of the commune, the governing mechanisms get crystalized
into an elite party or centralized state apparatus that inevitably becomes
autocratic. The abolition of private property and creation of the common inevitably
requires a governing mechanism and institutions of dispute resolution. Proponents
of the common often speak of the need for democratic governance of the common
by the people; but that is nothing more than an abstract ideal that has to be
concretized in legal form. In practice, that legal form takes the shape of a decisionmaking body (such as a communist party leadership) and juridical rules.
That is why the dream of a common has never truly existed at a national
level, historically. Every really-existing experiment has rapidly devolved into
another form of state dirigisme: an autocracy of an elite party or a centralized state
apparatus. Instead of referring to “communism,” we should call it something like
“party dirigisme.”
The same problems plague the term “socialism,” which, in its full form, is
simply the state ownership of the means of production as trustee for the citizens
of a country. Naturally, I am being reductionist here. Other philosophers, such as
Étienne Balibar, trace genealogies of socialism to other forms, such as
“autogestion,” that have far more in common with coöperation. Balibar makes the
astute observation in his analytics of socialism that the socialist project has always
included “two violently opposed tendencies: one statist and the other
autogestionnaire.”222 But as he himself acknowledges there, it is the statist side of
socialism that is the dominant thread and has been, in history and in the perception
of socialism. For purposes here, then, I will set aside the autogestionnaire variant
of socialism, which is indeed closer to coöperation. That will have to wait for further
development. I have only the statist version in mind here, and dismiss it.
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At bottom, the fundamental problem is that the concept of “the common” is
far too blunt an instrument to describe accurately how material goods and things
are distributed and used in society.
**
Naturally, this calls for a much longer discussion, and a more sustained debate with
Michael Hardt and Toni Negri on the one hand, and with Pierre Dardot and Christian
Laval on the other—all of whom have reimagined the concept of “the common” for
today.223
For the latter at least, but certainly not for the former, the argument for the
common similarly rejects the traditional notion of communism. Dardot and Laval
work hard to distinguish themselves from the type of state communism that, they
believe, has plagued the term “common.” They refer to “the communist burden” –
the way in which the actually-existing communist experiments have distorted the
concept of the common. Their main effort is to liberate the concept of the common
from the state. Dardot and Laval are adamantly anti-state communism. They write:
In other words, it [the common] is a term that helps us turn our back
on the strategy of state communism once and for all. By
appropriating and operating the means of production in its entirety,
the communist state methodically destroyed the prospects for real
socialism, which “has always been conceived of as a deepening –
not a rejection – of political democracy.” For those dissatisfied with
the neoliberal version of “freedom,” the common is thus a means
of opening up a new path. It is precisely this context that explains
the thematic emergence of the common in the 1990s. It was a
shared political demand that could be found in the most local and
concrete struggles, as well as within the largest national and
international political mobilizations.224
In fact, at practically every juncture, Dardot and Laval try to distinguish their
concept of “the common” from what has come before, so that it has a genuine
novelty to it. They even distinguish theirs from the notion of the commons tied to
the anti-globalization struggles of the 1990s. These struggles constructed the world
in terms of a second “enclosure”: not the early enclosure of lands in the 17th and
18th centuries, but rather a renewed global enclosure of property, associated with
privatization and neoliberalism, which took away common space from the people.
The struggle in the 1990s was to reclaim “the commons,” in the plural, consisting
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of water and land that are being privatized. However, by contrast to those antiglobalist movements, which they associate with trying to develop the commons
outside of capitalism as small isolated pockets, Dardot and Laval want to take a
different path.225 They reject this approach to changing the world without taking
power. They also simultaneously reject the Marxist logic of getting beyond
capitalism from within.
What Dardot and Laval call for is a revolutionary concept of “the common”
as a new way forward—one that will replace and, in the process, destroy
neoliberalism.226 They do not believe that piecemeal reform will do any good, or
even that the creation of pockets of common goods will save us from ecological
peril. Instead, they call for a radical transformation, a revolution in their words:
They call for “profoundly transforming the economy and the society by
overthrowing the system of norms that now directly threatens nature and humanity
itself.”227
Dardot and Laval emphasize and are careful to attribute the introduction of
the concept of “the common,” in the singular, to Hardt and Negri. They argue that
this is a decisive and radical achievement and probably the most important step
forward: not to think of the commons which effectively preceded capitalism, but
the concept of the common as a new development to get past capitalism.228 They
write:
For us, the common is the philosophical principle that makes it
possible to conceive of a future beyond neoliberalism, and for Hardt
and Negri the common is the only possible path toward a noncapitalist future. The common is also a category tasked with
undermining any residual nostalgia for state socialism, particularly
in terms of the state’s monopolization of a bureaucratized public
service. In other words, the common is a category that transcends
public and private.229
Dardot and Laval place their concept of the common in the lineage of the
environmental and ecological movements and the alter-globalization movements
in the 1990s—though, as we saw earlier, they seek to distinguish it from those
earlier experiments. Dardot and Laval trace the intellectual lineage directly back to
the writings of Hardt and Negri, to the empirical work done by and in the wake of
Elinor Ostrom, and to the emergence of what they referred to as the field of
“common studies.”230 They emphasize the shift from the plural to the singular,
from “the commons” to “the common,” reflecting the more abstract and
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substantial concept of the common as opposed to the traditional or historical
examples of commons. “In short, we are living in a moment in which the “common”
is a term that designates a regime of practices, struggles, institutions, and research
all dedicated to realizing a non-capitalist future.”231
This calls for a longer treatment, of course. But as I hope to have made clear
by this point and in the following chapters, the idea of getting rid of proprietary
interests that involve personal exclusive possession—including the opportunity to
improve and receive the benefits of those improvements—may work in a small
community or commune, but does not scale up to a national economy.
And therein lies the problem.
We need to design a coöperationist economy that can thrive alongside
dirigiste ones. Otherwise, too many will abscond with their wealth.

Getting Beyond the Cold War
In effect, and in this respect, I agree with Dardot and Laval that we
desperately need to get beyond the terms “capitalism” and “communism”—as well
as “socialism” for that matter. We need to get beyond the crude, vulgar debates of
the Cold War.
Historically, neither term was accurate. What was really at play was some
other confrontation between tournament dirigisme and something like state- or
party- centralized control of proprietary interests. The former is a system of spoils
directed by the government; to better understand this system, we need to read
Venkatesh and Levitt on gang finances in The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
August 2000, and explore the tournament model of Lazear and Rosen from 1981. 232
The latter is a system of spoils directed, most often, by a central party apparatus
that increasingly, today, resembles what we traditionally call “capitalism.”
It is imperative to imagine a grounded economic analysis as an alternative to
the worn and fruitless debates between “capitalism” and “communism” or even
“socialism.” It is imperative to reimagine a new form of coöperation as an economic
model in order to get beyond the illusory debate between Hayek and Marx.
The former rests on the fabricated myth of individualism, as if individuals
alone take responsibility for and achieve economic success, when in fact people
work together and are supported by each other. Economic productivity only works
through collaboration and coöperation. Too many of us in this country are still
entranced by the myth of American individualism—the idea that we can go it alone
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and invent and create and build things by ourselves and reap all the benefits. It is
so ingrained in the public imagination, tied to the image of the pioneer gold-digger
and the shiny rewards of solitary hard work. The ideology undergirds the private
corporate form and the logic of capital extraction. But for the most part, we
succeed in inventing, creating, and producing through mutual support, working
together, and collaboration. It is these forms of coöperation that must ground a
post-pandemic economy.
The latter rests on the fanciful imagination of an economic space that could
be shared by us all without conflict and decisionist dispute resolution. It does not
pay sufficient attention to the inevitable need for dispute resolution and the
inextricable fact that, in resolving disputes, someone or some small collective is
ultimately deciding distributional and proprietary interests.
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Chapter 3. Reimagining Coöperation
In order to move forward, it is essential to leave behind these Cold War ideologies.
The way to start is to return, briefly, to their genealogy as a way to identify where
they went off track.
In the nineteenth century, the movement for worker coöperatives and
workshops often pitted philanthropic entrepreneurs against communist or socialist
thinkers.
The former were often social reformers who were interested, not so much
in eliminating private property, as in relieving the misery of workers by sharing with
them some of the profits of their work and providing for their social welfare. Many
of the reformers imagined, and some built, utopian workshops, factories, and
company towns, that were intended to provide for the welfare of workers. The
Welsh industrialist, Robert Owen, who refashioned his textile factory at New Lanark
and in 1825 created a social utopia at New Harmony in Indiana; the French
merchant, Charles Fourier, who imagined and promoted the phalanstère and an
entirely new circulation of desire; the French politician and historian, Louis Blanc,
who advocated for government-sponsored worker coöperatives—these social
visionaries focused on reorganizing industrial modes of production in order to
center the interests of the workers and their families who toiled in the factories
and workshops. Louis Blanc’s most important tract, in fact, was precisely called The
Organization of Labor, published in 1839—one of the first texts to use the term
“capitalist” in its modern meaning and to declare “from each according to his
ability, to each according to his needs.” The emphasis was on reorganizing forms of
production for the benefit of workers and their families, limiting the hours of labor,
improving living conditions and education—not abolishing private property tout
court.
The latter were more focused on overturning the regime of private property
as a means of revolutionizing modes of production. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the
first self-proclaimed anarchist, championed the abolition of property and imagined
workshops in which workers had full possession of the means of production. Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels famously proposed the “expropriation of the
expropriators” in The Communist Manifesto, inspiring generations of communists
to embrace the conviction that change in society must pass through a revolution in
the property regime and the abolition of private property. Socialist thinkers, such
as Louis Auguste Blanqui and others, favored the expropriation of property as a
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means to enable either a commune or state ownership and organization of the
means of production.
The long history of the twentieth century, however, should have taught us at
least one lesson: property is never abolished, it is simply modified. What matters is
not what we call it, but who reaps the benefits of its use, of its temporary
possession, of the fruits of its product. Someone or some entity—whether it is one
or more persons, a collective, a communist party, the state, or the general will—
always has the final say on who gets to enjoy the advantages of material
possessions and their fruits. There is no escaping the reality of a final decisionmaker—and that person or entity inexorably allocates proprietary interests.
In effect, the abolition of property is an illusion: material goods, equipment,
tools, machines, cars, land, real estate, in short, all material things are subject to
competing claims to use and enjoyment, whether temporary or long-lasting. Those
competing claims do not resolve by themselves. And whoever or whatever
institution ultimately resolves them—whether a judge, a chief, the majority, an
autocrat, or a party—they will be allocating proprietary interests. Whoever is
allowed to glean dead timber, maintain a forest, build a shelter, consume the fruits,
hunt, or simply walk through the land is exercising a proprietary claim, and
someone will decide whether they are allowed to do so.
To think properly about property, one must return to the articulation of
different proprietary interests—whether in Roman Law, borrowing concepts like
usus, fructus, abusus, or in American Legal Realism with the notion of “bundles” in
property law. One must understand that property is not a monolithic unitary thing
that can be scrapped or allocated whole. It is a complex bundle of interests that are
always separated and allocated in myriad ways and that never go away.233 And this
is the most important thing: someone or some entity, ultimately and inexorably,
gets to decide and have the final say on how those interests are distributed and who
gets to enjoy them. That will never go away, even if we “abolish property.”
***
Thus, the challenge today can no longer be posed through a nineteenth century
dichotomy of social utopianism versus communism, nor of worker welfare versus
the abolition of property. The task is not to abolish property, which is no more than
a quixotic phantasm. No, it must focus instead on the actual distribution of the
enjoyment of material things. This requires a detailed analysis, dissection, and
allocation of proprietary interests. And this leads directly to the question of who
gets to reap or share the benefits of economic production, circulation, and
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consumption—whether it is the consumer, the worker, the merchant, the capital
investor, the politician, the party member, etc.
This calls for a complete reimagination of the classic nineteenth century
debates over worker workshops, communism, and socialism. Instead, we now,
more than ever, need to engage in the intricate work of redesigning the distribution
of proprietary interests associated with the production of wealth in society.
In order to achieve a just and equal distribution, coöperation must be
reimagined for the twenty-first century, not as an abstract economic regime, but
rather as a specific, concrete allocation and distribution of material interests. It is
only in this way that coöperationism will be able to overcome the worn and now
counterproductive debates between so-called capitalism on the one hand and
communism or socialism on the other. One must analyze concrete distributions, not
imagined ideal-types.
To make any progress, then, we need to focus on the actions that humans
take. It has to be all about the verbs: possessing, using, improving, zoning, reaping
the benefits of proprietary interests. The basic building block is not money, capital,
or private property, but use, zoning, taking, improving, alienating goods, land,
workshops, etc.
Specific concrete distributions are what matter. Before beginning to analyze
the possible dimensions of proprietary interests, it is important first to articulate
the panoply of subjects and objects—the different entities and forms associated
with material possessions.

The Myriad Dimensions of Proprietary Interests
In order to even begin to chart just distributions, it is essential to map the
myriad dimensions of proprietary interests.
There are, first, a finite set of entities that can be rights bearers, in other
words who can exercise proprietary interests over things or who can be given the
right to use or enjoy property. Depending on those rights bearers, we tend to
describe the corresponding property relation in the following terms:
• The state as owner, which generally corresponds to state ownership,
controlled economies, or the nationalization of industries;
• An individual, partnership, or legally chartered corporation, which
usually corresponds to regimes of individual, personal, group, or
private property;
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• A collective (e.g. farmer coöperative; factory workers), which
typically corresponds to collective property, collectivism, or
coöperatives;
• The people owning in common, or what we often refer to today as
“the common,” or in earlier times as “the commons.”
Notice that these different subjects can be on either side of the property
equation, so that the state could have title to land and allow a private individual to
use it; or the other way around, an individual could have title to land and allow the
state to use it.
Second, there are different things that can be the object of property. Most
legal regimes throughout history have differentiated between:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Land and buildings (real estate)
Movable or chattel property (goods, commodities, supplies)
Personal possessions (clothes, bedding, food)
Intangible property (intellectual property)
Modes of production (equipment, tools)
Financial property (stocks, bonds, bank accounts)

Notice here that there can be different proprietary regimes for and within
each type of property. So, for instance, land could be owned by the state or a tribal
nation, while the buildings on the land could be used or leased to private
individuals; personal possessions could be assigned entirely to individuals, while
modes of production could be the property of the collective.
Third, there are an assortment (bundle) of proprietary rights assigned to
each of these subjects and kinds of property. So, for instance, with regard to land,
there could be an assignment to different subjects of each of these interests:
• The decision who uses the land (use)
• The decision how the land is used (zoning)
• The decision how the revenue from the use of the land is distributed
(enjoying the fruits)
• The decision who can improve or alter the land (improvements)
• The decision who can reap the rewards of these improvements
• The decision who has power to transfer or alienate these interests
• The decision who can assign these interests
• The decision who can adjudicate any disputes regarding these
assignments
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In their book Common, Dardot and Laval propose and discuss a similar list of
these possible proprietary interests.234 The American Realists, much before them,
showed us how these bundles of rights can be separated.
Fourth, and finally, it is important to emphasize that whoever gets to decide
about how to interpret and resolve disputes about the different options listed
above is determinative. The final arbiter is, de facto, the one with the real
proprietary interest. If we decide, for instance, that it is a state supreme court that
has the final say over property rights in the state, then that court is ultimately the
arbiter of property relations. If it is a people’s council or open to popular
democratic accountability, then the people ultimately have control over
proprietary interests. The final decision-maker may ultimately have more power
over the property framework than the entity who purportedly has the authority to
allocate. This is why judicial review in the United States is, in the end, such a
powerful tool for judges.

Allocating the Proprietary Interests
Once the different dimensions of proprietary interests become clear, we are
in a position to allocate them justly and equally without returning to the fictions of,
on the one hand, “private property” or, on the other, “abolishing property.”
Regimes of so-called “private property” are actually state-controlled allocations
and enforcement of proprietary interests granting and favoring, for the most part,
unlimited accumulation of use and alienation to individuals by means of lower
capital gains taxes and no inheritance taxes. These are regimes that favor the
concentration of wealth in the hands of the wealthy, white, privileged. Regimes
that supposedly “abolish property” are actually state- or party-controlled
allocations and enforcement of proprietary interests that tend to favor those and
their families and friends in decision-making capacities—another elite.
The ambition of coöperation is to reallocate proprietary interests in such a
way as to produce wealth equality and social justice. There are many possible ways
to do this, but here, for instance, is one approach. Again, it is all a question of mixing
and matching the different dimensions of proprietary interests, discussed above,
to create a just society. This is just one approach, purely hypothetical:
1. The final decision-making power to resolve any dispute over
proprietary interests will be allocated to a 9-person committee
consisting of seasoned members of mutual organizations and
coöperatives, elected by all the members of coöperationist
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

institutions. The determinations of this 9-person body will bind the law
enforcement mechanisms of society.
The incorporation statutes will favor mutuals, coöperatives, and nonprofits through tax incentives and benefits; traditional investor capital
will either be struck from the corporate code or disfavored through
tax and transfer.
All land will be owned by a trust set up for the benefit of current and
future generations; the use and improvement and benefits of any
improvements on land will be allocated to the individual with the
possessory interest. Possession and use of land will be determined by
an assembly elected by all citizens at the state level.
Individuals will have possessory interests (including exclusive use,
right to improve and to enjoy the benefits of improvements, and the
right to alienate) of their residential homes or coöperative
apartments, which they will be allowed to buy and sell.
Individuals will have exclusive possessory interests (including use and
the right to alienate) of personal property consisting of personal items,
clothes, household goods, vehicles, and money.
All proprietary interests will extend only over the life of individuals and
will not transfer upon death.

Obviously, I am simplifying things to keep them simple, but you understand:
the allocation of all the different proprietary interests can be organized and
distributed in myriad ways that would promote (or undermine) coöperation.
It is time to reconfigure and reimagine coöperation for the real, concrete,
material world, and not for an abstract fantasy.

The Simplicity of Coöperation
The most important point is that it is extremely easy to design coöperationist
arrangements. It is as easy as rewriting the laws of incorporation. The fact is,
designing coöperation—just like designing capital—uses the basic toolkit of the
lawyer, a toolkit that has been used and mastered for centuries. It is as easy as
using a hammer or screwdriver. It is basic plumbing for the lawyer.
Katharina Pistor explains this well in her book, The Code of Capital—in the
context of capital, of course. The same applies to coöperation. But let’s use the case
of capital here.
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In The Code of Capital, Pistor demonstrates how lawyers, deploying the
conventional classic tools of legal practice and relying on the enforcement powers
of the state, turn ordinary assets into capital.
As noted earlier, Pistor defines “capital” as an asset with advantageous
properties for its owner: The advantageous properties render the asset more
valuable because it has a competitive advantage over other assets. It may be
protected from taxation; it may have priority claims as against other credit holders;
it may survive an economic downturn by contrast to other assets or even less well
coded capital.
Historically, the class of assets that could be coded as capital—transformed
into capital by lawyers—has changed over time. Whereas before it included
primarily landed property and immovable goods, over time it has come to include
ideas and know-how (intellectual property, trademarks, and patents) as well as
digital assets such as computer code.
But the notion of an asset is very simple and consists of anything that can be
owned.
And the methods of coding capital are simple and basic as well, as Katharina
Pistor demonstrates. They include the basic building blocks of the law school
curriculum – contract law, property law, corporations, trusts and bankruptcy. These
are all classical tools of the law, even if they can be used in innovative ways to
create unheard of capital forms, such as the complex derivatives and mortgagebacked securities that were responsible for the 2007 recession.
What turns assets into capital is the combination of legal code and state
enforcement. This has two elements, then: law and government. Regarding the
law, Pistor could not be clearer that it is lawyers who convert assets into capital,
through simple legal processes and transformations. She is talking about the “legal
coding of capital.” As she emphasizes, “observers treat law as a side show when in
fact it is the very cloth from which capital is cut.” 235 At the same time, she is equally
clear about the centrality of the state. Without the state’s protection and
enforcement of the legal code, it could not operate. As she writes, “accumulating
wealth over long stretches of time requires additional fortification that only a code
backed by the coercive powers of the state can offer.”236
Together, lawyers and the state can provide and enforce “the code of
capital” that serves to give the capital holder an advantage over others. Together
they provide “the legal privileging of some assets, which gives their holders a
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comparative advantage in accumulating wealth over others.”237 “In short, capital is
inextricably linked to law and state power.”238
But the most important point of Pistor’s work is to show how simple the
plumbing is: first, we are dealing with very basic assets. The class of assets are
common and straightforward. They include land, debt, knowledge, and firms or
institutions; the list grew, in time, to include intellectual property and digital assets
like code itself.239 As Pistor writes, “ordinary assets are just that—a plot of land, a
promise to be paid in the future, the pooled resources from friends and family to
set up a new business, or individual skills and know-how.”240 Second, the tools of
the trade, those of the attorney, are also basic. They are the core elements of
private law, most of which are taught in the first year of law school: contract law,
property law, as well as second-year courses in corporations, trusts and estates,
bankruptcy law, and secured transactions. Third, the transformation of assets into
capital is a simple enhancement that gives some assets merely “a comparative
advantage over others.”241 Those advantages are also simple and can be reduced
to four mainly: priority, or the idea that the capital owner has a higher claim to an
asset than others; durability, which means that the ownership extends in time;
universality, which means that it extends spatially; and convertibility, which means
the capability to convert the asset into liquid money. 242 As Pistor writes, “Law is
code; it turns a simple asset into a capital asset by bestowing the attributes of
priority, durability, universality, and convertibility on it.”243 Fourth and finally, the
entire scheme rests on two very basic instincts or practices common throughout
history:
For centuries, private attorneys have molded and adapted these
legal modules to a changing roster of assets and have thereby
enhanced their clients’ wealth. And states have supported the
coding of capital by offering their coercive law powers to enforce
the legal rights that have been bestowed on capital.244
Pistor brilliantly lays this out in her book, The Code of Capital. Others as well
spell out this essential, intimate, but basic link between legal practice and
government enforcement. Surprisingly, some of the German Ordoliberals did as
well—as Foucault details in The Birth of Biopolitics. This is, in fact, precisely the
“singularity” that Foucault associates with the German Ordoliberals: the
recognition of the central role of legal regulation in structuring the market
society—or what Foucault writes, “the redefinition of the juridical institution and
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of the necessary rules of right in a society regulated on the basis of and in terms of
the competitive market economy: the problem then, broadly speaking, of law.”245
In a fascinating passage discussing the Walter Lippmann colloquium held in
France in August 1938, Foucault cites the organizer, Louis Rougier, who places basic
legal regulation at the core of market society—anticipating perhaps “the code of
capital.” Rougier was more of a liberal than an ordo-neoliberal, but his language
and ideas tracked theirs, to an extent. Rougier says:
The liberal regime is not just the result of a spontaneous natural
order as the many authors of the Natural codes declared in the
eighteenth century; it is also the result of a legal order that
presupposes juridical intervention by the state. Economic life takes
place [in fact] within a juridical framework which fixes the regime of
property, contracts, patents, bankruptcy, the status of professional
associations and commercial societies, the currency, and banking,
none of which are given by nature, like the laws of economic
equilibrium, but are contingent creations of legislation.246
This is a striking passage that corresponds pretty well to the views of the
Ordoliberals (though they would subsume the notion of natural order entirely
within that of legal order247) and prefigures the argument about the legal
foundations of capital. Rougier goes on to say:
Being liberal is not like the ‘Manchester’ attitude, allowing vehicles
to circulate in any direction, according to whim, with the
consequence of endless congestion and accidents; and it is not that
of the ‘planners,’ fixing the hours of use and routes to be followed
for every vehicle: it means imposing a Highway Code, while
accepting that at a time of faster means of transport this code will
not necessarily be the same as in the time of stagecoaches.248
This idea of a “Highway Code” has several important implications for Rougier
and for the Ordoliberals that Foucault teases out well in his analysis in The Birth of
Biopolitics. First, it entails that the economic and juridical are fully integrated: the
relationship between law and economics is not one of superstructure and
infrastructure, but of co-constituency. The model is not Marx, but Weber. Second,
it calls for economic-institutional historical analyses. Third, and most importantly,
it makes possible a conception of “the survival of capitalism.”249
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All of this work, especially Pistor’s, makes plain that capital is easily
constructed using the basic tools of law, enforced by government.
The code of coöperation is just as simple.
The way to code assets so that they are held in a mutual or credit union, the
rules about profit distributions, and the laws of incorporation are the basic building
blocks of lawyers.
It is as simple to them as the use of a power drill is to the mechanic.
We know how to incorporate coöperatives and mutuals.
We know how to code coöperation.
The question is one of will, not of knowledge or expertise.

Addressing Global Climate Change
Coöperation is, incidentally, the only way we will be able to confront and
remedy global climate change. The fundamental principles and ideals underlying
coöperation represent the best path forward toward sustainability.
Those principles favor equal voice and shared well-being, both of which are
essential to creating a more sustainable environment. Under the United Nations
guidelines, the principles that define the coöperative enterprise include: open and
voluntary membership, democratic member control of the enterprise, participation
in the enterprise, as well as autonomy and independence.250 These mirror the
seven core principles of coöperatives that have emerged in the literature on
coöperation—and include, as well, each member having substantially equal control
and ownership; each member having a functional role in the enterprise; and a
primary focus on the well-being of the members.251 What characterizes the
coöperative versus other forms of business structures is the notion of onemember-one-vote and the fact that the primary purpose of a coöperative is not
profit maximization or short-term growth, but general well-being.252
Those guiding principles of equality and welfare are precisely the values that
will promote a more sustainable living environment.

60
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3702010

Chapter 4. Abolishing Capital
Charting a new coöperationist landscape is as straightforward as realigning the
property dimensions and reallocating proprietary interests. Reimagining an
economy based on coöperation requires only a few fundamentals of corporate
finance.

The Corporate Finance of Coöperation
Under the current regime of capital investment, a commercial enterprise is
started either by an individual, who buys their tools and materials and starts making
and selling goods or services; or by a partnership of individuals, who essentially do
the same thing. They can incorporate and form a corporation or limited liability
partnership, all of which are ways to protect them from personal liability for the
obligations of the company. They use the corporate form as a shield from personal
liability, as a way to keep their finances separate, to gain tax advantages, to get
credit from a bank, and so on.
The privately held company
As a privately held company (whether founder-owned, family-owned, or a
partnership), the company can buy and sell real property in its name, as well as
goods, equipment, and intangibles. It owns all the assets (tools, inventory, goods,
accounts receivable or payable, etc.) and is responsible for any debt. The owners
of the company can engage in all the following activities. They can:
• Buy and own real estate and equipment.
• Lawfully use their real estate and equipment in any way they want.
• Sell, transact, exchange, and offer all the goods or services that they
produce.
• Sell the company or any of its assets, or transform the structure of the
company into something else, such as an LLC or a B Corp.
• Take out loans, pay off loans, increase or reduce their debt.
• Pay themselves salaries.
• Hire and pay employees (at or above minimum wage).
• Pay taxes on their profits.
• Reinvest some of their profits into the enterprise.
• Distribute moneys to the owners as distributed corporate profits.
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Essentially, the owners of a privately held company can do everything except
raise equity on a public stock exchange, for which they would need to do an initial
public offering (IPO) and become a publicly held company (with the minor
exception of Regulation D, which allows privately held companies to sell a small,
limited number of equity shares without registering with the SEC).
In a privately held company, as a result, the equity that the owners have in
the company is not very liquid. In order to take their money out, the owners need
to sell assets or distribute profits, pay themselves higher salaries, dissolve the
company, or sell their equity in the company to someone else. This makes it slightly
difficult for a company to raise major capital inflows.
The publicly traded corporation
And that, naturally, is the major difference between the privately held
company and the publicly held company: in the latter, capital can flow in (or out)
through the sale of equity shares on a public market. The fluctuating value of those
publicly traded shares will change the value of the firm and therefore affect its
ability to borrow money or raise more capital. The speculative nature of equity
markets affects, positively and negatively, the ability of publicly traded companies
to attract capital.
In order to become a publicly held company, a privately held company must
go public through an IPO and raise equity capital from investors who become equity
shareholders. One of the greatest differences, then, between the private and public
firm is all the disclosure regulations that surround the publicly traded company (all
the SEC filings, quarterly statements, etc.).
So, the publicly traded company can do all the things that the privately held
company can do, listed earlier, plus raise equity capital on the public markets. Some
of the things it can do will have different names. The distribution of corporate
profits, for instance, is called dividends in the case of publicly traded companies.
But the functionalities are the same. In addition, publicly traded companies can also
buy back their equity shares by buying their stock on the market, often enhancing
the value of the remaining shares.
In publicly traded corporations, the management runs the company and
satisfies the shareholders in good times through dividends (paying out profit) and
increased equity value (increasing stock price), which keep the investors holding on
to the stock (or selling happily at a higher price) and thus increasing the company’s
equity value.
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The equity shares are the ownership stake in the enterprise. They represent
the value of the enterprise. Their value should be related to the current and
expected profitability and cash flows of the company. On a double-entry
accounting balance sheet, their value should reflect current assets, property,
machinery, and goods owned, as well as the expected stream of incoming revenue,
accounts payable, and likely future earnings, net of any debt or other obligations.
Theoretically, the wealth of the enterprise could be distributed to the
different stakeholders of the company by means of the salaries and benefits for the
management and workers, the contractual exchanges with customers or providers
of goods and services, and the distributions and benefits to the investor
shareholders. All of the wealth of the firm could be distributed in these different
ways. In other words, all of the wealth generated by a publicly held corporation
(over and above the servicing of debt obligations and the costs of operation) could
be equitably distributed to workers, management, and outside affiliates, like the
consumers or suppliers. But those distributional decisions are controlled by the
management, under the supervision of the board of directors, and ultimately by
the shareholders. As a result, it is usually the management and shareholders who
extract wealth from the firm.
The extraction of wealth by shareholders and management happens in a few
ways. First, there are dividend distributions: the enterprise distributes part of its
profits by means of a dividend on shares. Second, there is the value of the
shareholding itself. If the firm is publicly traded, then that value can increase and
be sold on the stock market at a profit. Management can find ways to affect stock
prices (e.g. stock buyback programs) and thereby increase share value.
By contrast to ordinary creditors (e.g. banks that loan to the enterprise or
other bond holders), the shareholders assume more risk in return for the prospect
of receiving a greater return. If things go badly, their equity stake may be wiped
out. They have no guarantee of recouping their investment in case of bankruptcy,
by contrast to a secured or primary creditor. If things go well, their return is not
fixed by contract, as with debt obligations, but can exceed expectations.
In this sense, there is a gambling aspect to capital investment. It is a form of
elegant, economic, educated gambling. Many of the early stock companies, like the
West or East India trading companies, began as forms of gambling by the Dutch and
British elite. And at the time, the ties to the slave trade were thick. It would also be
important to discuss Lloyds of London in this regard. What is clear is that a logic of
gambling undergirds capital investment. Like the horse track or casinos, betting on
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a commercial enterprise through stock acquisition is principally about making a
profit and cares little, or at least, has little incentive to care for the welfare of the
others affiliated with the enterprise.
Coöperative enterprises
As opposed to a gambling logic, coöperation operates more on a
sustainability and welfare logic. Its principal goal is the long-term welfare of its
members. This changes the equation, even if the fundamentals of corporate
finance are not that different.
The members of a coöperative (whether they are consumers, workers,
producers, bank account- or insurance-holders) acquire a share in the enterprise
either by purchasing that stake or by using or working for the enterprise. The
members become, in effect, the shareholders, and they detain the equity in the
firm. In other words, whatever the value of the enterprise is—again, meaning the
assets and expected revenues, minus the debt obligations—that value is effectively
held by the members of the coöperative.
As the mutual enterprise creates value (say, through profits or selling assets
at a higher price), that additional value can either be funneled back into the
business or distributed to its members. Nothing here, so far, is technically different
than in the publicly traded corporation. The wealth of the coöperative, like the
latter, is essentially distributed by means of salaries to the employees, contractual
exchanges with customers and providers of goods and services, and distributions
and enhanced membership stakes for the members. The flows are similar, though
the categories may have different names. Whereas distributions may be called
dividends for the publicly traded corporation, they may be called “patronage
refunds” in consumer coöperatives or “profit distributions” in worker coöperatives.
A non-profit is not fundamentally different from a coöperative, except that
the stakeholders do not receive distributions. The non-profit raises money
predominantly through grants and charitable donations, and it distributes value
through its operations and as salaries to its employees. It does not distribute any
profit to its stakeholders, as a coöperative could if it were making a profit. Extra
moneys raised by the non-profit over and above its operating expenses go into an
endowment as a reserve for future years or are invested in building and equipment,
or just placed in reserve for bad years. Again, the flows themselves are essentially
comparable in the different types of enterprises—coöperatives and non-profit
institutions.
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All the Difference
However, there are two major differences between the publicly held
corporation and the coöperative-type enterprises.
The first is that the coöperative enterprise (like the privately held
corporation) has no liquid, transferrable equity and cannot raise capital on the
public markets. This places constraints on its ability to grow. It means that the
mutual enterprise can only expand by bringing in more members (who often have
less disposable cash than capital investors) or by borrowing or issuing obligations.
Naturally, this places financial constraints on the coöperative. It makes it all the
more important to cultivate symbiotic relations with credit unions and coöperative
banks—as, for instance, Mondragon has done with the Caja Laboral Popular.253
The second is that the decision-makers in a coöperative are themselves
members of the ongoing enterprise and accountable to the other members, rather
than to outside investors. And this latter distinction makes all the difference. It
means that the decision-makers care about the sustainability of the enterprise and
the welfare of the members, rather than its immediate or short-term value. It
means that the members in management positions have the members
themselves—whether workers or consumers or producers—as their foremost
interest. The coöperatives exist to benefit their members.
This has dramatic implications. It should not come as a surprise, then, that at
the member coöperatives of Mondragon, for instance, the disparity between the
salary of the highest-paid directors and that of the lowest-paid workers cannot
exceed 4.5 to 1.254 When the members are the decision-makers, the results are
likely to be more equitable and just. Compare this to the average disparity in wages
in enterprises in the United States today—what is often called the “wage ratio”
between CEO pay and average worker pay. The average disparity stood at 303 to 1
in 2014.255 At McDonald’s, the wage ratio in 2018 was 3,101 to 1.256
Après moi, le déluge. Dardot and Laval refer to this as “the true ‘spirit of
capitalism.’”257 They are entirely right. The fact is, capital investors have little
reason to care about the welfare of the company’s employees while they are
invested, and they have absolutely no reason to care about the company itself or
its employees after they have sold their shareholdings. If anything, schadenfreude
will make them secretly wish that the company’s value decreases; in fact, that
expectation is often what leads to the sale of stock.
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What this means, naturally, is that the capital investors do not have an
ongoing interest (or incentive) to pay attention to the long-term welfare of workers
or employees or really anyone else touched by the enterprise. The profit motive is
the only direct interest that the shareholder has. This is a recipe for disaster.
Especially given that the business model of the publicly traded corporation depends
on continued capital investment by future shareholders, whereas the models of
coöperatives and non-profits do not.
Redesigning the corporate landscape for coöperation
The puzzle, then, is how to redesign the corporate landscape in such a way
as to retain all the advantages of the coöperative framework—the emphasis on
sustainability and prioritizing the welfare of consumers, workers, producers,
affiliates, etc.—while ensuring the ability to raise sufficient funds for economic
growth. The fact is, a lot of wealth in the United States is invested in capital. The
immediate question, then, is how that capital could be turned into funds to support
economic growth in a coöperationist framework.
To be more precise, the total value of the equity markets in the United
States, as of December 31, 2019, was $37.7 trillion,258 consists of the following:
• The New York Stock Exchange, which lists about 2,400 companies, has a
total equity value (market capitalization) of about $21 trillion (in 2019)
• The NASDAQ (originally, the National Association of Securities Dealer
Automated Quotation system), which lists about 3,800 companies, has a
total equity value of about $11 trillion (in 2019)
• The OTC (over the counter, officially the OTCQX U.S. Market), which trades
about 10,000 over-the-counter securities, including foreign companies and
multinationals, and other quirky entities.
At the global level, the total value of all stocks around the world stood at
about $90 trillion in 2019.259
This capital, invested in the stock markets, consists either of savings
(retirement accounts, brokerage accounts, bank accounts that are invested by
banks, etc.) or borrowed moneys on margin. Total margin debt (individual and
institutional) in the United States stood at around $600 billion in 2019, equal to
about 1.6% of the market capitalization of the stock markets, so a small fraction.260
The total market capitalization, then, represents, essentially, disposable savings as
investments. The $37.7 trillion in the United States represent mostly moneys that
individuals ultimately own—either directly through retirement accounts,
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brokerage accounts, holdings of mutual funds, or indirectly through savings
accounts that are then invested into the market (or loaned out) by banks, or doubly
indirectly by corporations (ultimately owned by shareholders) that invest in the
markets themselves.
Surprisingly, though, these numbers are not that big. First, on a per capita
basis (with a U.S. total population of 329.6 million),261 the market capitalization is
about $114,381 per person (if only Americans, and not foreigners, held the capital).
Second, in the aggregate, they are not that big either. To put them in perspective,
it is worth emphasizing that:
• The U.S. national debt stood at about $25 trillion on May 8, 2020 262
• The U.S. GDP stood at about $21 trillion on May 8, 2020 263
Plus, the national debt is skyrocketing. It already exceeded $26 trillion by the end
of June 2020, up more than $3 trillion in the first six months of 2020. As a result of
the COVID-19 bailouts, the national debt now stands at 98% of the economy, and
is projected to outsize the nation’s entire annual economy in 2021—a situation that
the country has not experienced since World War II.264 According to the
Congressional Budget Office, “Federal debt, as a share of the economy, is now on
track to smash America’s World War II-era record by 2023.”265 On a per capita basis,
again, that’s about $212,000 in debt per American taxpayer, or $80,000 per
citizen.266
This almost wipes out the aggregate U.S. market capitalization.
So, in other words, all the talk about the importance of market capital is
empty: it is pretty much borrowed money at the national level. And as an aside, the
total value of market capitalization in the United States is likely to collapse after
the 2020 elections when President Trump no longer has the same election
incentive to keep the markets at artificial highs through massive indebtedness.
Given that the markets have not in any way absorbed the economic recession that
is and will continue in light of COVID-19 or the massive indebtedness of the United
States, the present market bubble is sure to explode before the next inauguration.
In any event, market capitalization in this country is now pretty much a figment of
our imagination—and of the national debt.
Even so, if the corporate landscape were reconfigured to favor coöperation,
a significant portion of the money that is now market capitalization would be
reinvested into coöperative and mutual enterprises as membership equity.
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So, first, capital investors would use their savings to invest in themselves and
their ongoing enterprises. Workers and employees would put portions of their
savings into the enterprises to form coöperatives. Producers, consumers, retailers
as well would invest in coöperation. Much of the existing capital would be placed
in our own ongoing businesses.
Second, capital investors could lend their moneys to coöperative enterprises.
In other words, another big portion of the existing capital markets would be
reinvested in the debt obligations of coöperatives. This could be incentivized by the
government assuring a certain level of return on the debt obligations of
coöperatives and by securing those loans, which would make it even more
attractive for those with capital to place their savings in coöperative enterprises.
Third, and most importantly, there would be a gradual redistribution and
evening of wealth over the longer-term that effectively would displace the kind of
hoarding of wealth that produces so much of the market capitalization. In effect, a
more equalized distribution of wealth would mean that a portion of the capital
would be used instead as consumption: employees and workers would have more
money to spend on their homes and vehicles and household goods and other goods
and services. The invested capital, in part, would be funneled back into the
economy as consumption and circulation.
The redesign and creation of a coöperationist economy will reduce the
amount of wealth that is extracted as capital and returned into investment
speculation. Any profits that the coöperative enterprise makes (after paying taxes
on any profit and reinvesting a certain amount of the profits in the enterprise) will
be distributed to the members. The return on members’ equity may be lower than
one would expect from extractive capitalism, primarily because salaries may be
higher for most workers and more equitable. But as more equitable wealth begins
to permeate the economy, it will be transformed into consumption and economic
growth.

Fending Off the Skeptics
Could an economy based entirely on coöperation really exist? How would it
compete against or within a global capitalist system? How would coöperative
enterprises raise sufficient cash to grow? Could coöperatives become huge
multinationals, like Boeing or IBM, or now Amazon, Apple, or Google? We know
that economies of scale return profits to enterprises. How could domestic
coöperatives compete with foreign giant multinationals?
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Part of the puzzlement in this regard is a shared belief today—at least, shared
by many if not most today in the United States—that capitalism won in 1989 and
vanquished collectivism when the Berlin Wall fell. In other words, there is a shared
imaginary that the United States and the U.S.S.R. were two competing models—
capitalism versus communism, or some form of collectivism—and that the U.S.
model prevailed. And it is certainly true that Russia, in the post-Soviet era, has itself
turned to tournament dirigisme, and that China as well is there or headed there—
and that collectivism everywhere else across the world has pretty much lost steam,
whether in Vietnam or Venezuela. Most Americans share the believe that recent
history reflects the triumph of capitalism.
As I argued earlier, though, this Cold War mentality is entirely misplaced, and
both terms capitalism and communism are misleading. If anything, one style of
dirigisme beat another, but that tells us nothing about the potential for genuine
coöperation.
Coöperationism is not communism—in fact, it is just as opposed to the
illusion of communism as it is to the illusion of capitalism. Both of those other
political economic systems are types of state dirigisme that benefit elites—the
wealthy or the party members, or both at the same time. By contrast,
coöperationism, as described here, centers the consumers and workers and
members of all the mutual enterprises. Coöperation turns the economy over to
those of us who create, invent, produce, make, work, labor, and serve others. It
privileges the welfare of us all—employees, workers, consumers, producers, credit
union account- and mutual insurance-holders—and the sustainability of our
enterprises, and of our environment.
So, we need to set aside the ideological debates about capitalism versus
communism and understand that we have never honestly tried coöperation.
The Higher Return on Capital
Even so, even if we set aside the Cold War debates, some might argue that
the return on capital invested in the stock market has always exceeded the return
on obligations—and would likely exceed the return on coöperative membership.
As a result, capital wealth would just flee the coöperationist jurisdictions and find
other countries in which to invest. There would be a flight of capital and no way to
funnel that capital into coöperative enterprises. The economy, in effect, would
collapse.
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It is of course true that capital investment has historically outperformed
investment in Treasury, state, municipal, or corporate bonds. We tend to explain
that based on the risk-reward equation: the return on U.S. Treasuries, for instance,
has historically been much lower than the return on stocks because there is
practically no or little or less risk. The spread between the (long-term) return on
Treasury bonds and stock markets supposedly reflects this natural risk-reward
equation. To be sure, right now, in September 2020, it is a particularly strange time
to compare Treasuries and the stock market because the United States is devouring
debt, which is pushing government fixed-income returns to nothing—in fact, even
negative returns for a split moment—and inflating the S&P 500. But the historical
data is consistent. For $100 invested at the start of 1928, you would have had in
2019:
•
•
•
•

$502,417.21 if you had placed it in S&P 500;
$ 48,668.87 if you had placed it in BAA Corporate Bonds;
$ 8,012.89 if you had placed it in US Treasury bonds; and only
$ 2,079.94 if you had placed it in 3-month Treasury bills.267

There is, of course, greater risk if one speculates on individual stocks and
does not maintain a diversified portfolio. But if you kept the money in a market
index and did not speculate further—if, for instance, you just had an S&P 500 Index
over the long-term—here is what the returns for the four asset classes would have
been over the past two decades268:

Year

S&P
500 3-month
Treasury Bill
(includes
dividends)

U.S. Treasury BAA
Bond
Corporate
Bond

1999

20.89%

4.64%

-8.25%

0.84%

2000

-9.03%

5.82%

16.66%

9.33%

2001

-11.85%

3.39%

5.57%

7.82%

2002

-21.97%

1.60%

15.12%

12.18%

2003

28.36%

1.01%

0.38%

13.53%

2004

10.74%

1.37%

4.49%

9.89%

2005

4.83%

3.15%

2.87%

4.92%

2006

15.61%

4.73%

1.96%

7.05%

2007

5.48%

4.35%

10.21%

3.15%
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2008

-36.55%

1.37%

20.10%

-5.07%

2009

25.94%

0.15%

-11.12%

23.33%

2010

14.82%

0.14%

8.46%

8.35%

2011

2.10%

0.05%

16.04%

12.58%

2012

15.89%

0.09%

2.97%

10.12%

2013

32.15%

0.06%

-9.10%

-1.06%

2014

13.52%

0.03%

10.75%

10.38%

2015

1.38%

0.05%

1.28%

-0.70%

2016

11.77%

0.32%

0.69%

10.37%

2017

21.61%

0.93%

2.80%

9.72%

2018

-4.23%

1.94%

-0.02%

-2.76%

2019

31.22%

1.55%

9.64%

15.33%

The fact is, historically, over the period 1928-2018, the average returns have
been sharply different: “On an annual basis over this period, the return on the S&P
500 averaged 9.5% per year, T-bonds 4.8% and T-bills 3.4%.”269 From a financial
perspective, the compounded difference in interest of about 5% over 90 years
results in a huge difference in wealth. In the short term, people may prefer to avoid
the risk, but over the long term, the differential is staggering.
Though hard to believe, this is actually right—mathematically. If you use for
instance the compound interest calculator on the website of the U.S.
government,270 and you compare 4.8 and 9.5% compounded annually, you get a
striking difference:
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Now, part of this differential is reduced as a result of existing tax rates. Most
of us are familiar with the basic tax rules:
1. Dividends from stock holdings (which are paid with after-tax corporate
dollars), are taxable at the federal, state, and local level, but at a lower rate
equal to a maximum rate of 20% at the federal level for qualified dividends;
2. Returns on capital (capital gains) will depend on whether they are short or
long term;
3. Long-term capital gains are taxed at a lower rate (20% federal maximum
about, depending on tax bracket);
4. Interest income is fully taxable at ordinary income tax rates, which can
easily reach almost 50% in high tax brackets when federal, state, and
municipal taxes are included;
5. Interest on U.S. Treasuries will be taxed at the federal income tax rate, but
exempt from state and local taxes;
6. Interest on municipal bonds is triple-tax free.
So, in effect, and these are back of the envelope calculations, it is fair to say
that the difference in the net return on the different investment portfolios would
be less sharp than in the above scenario. In simple terms, we might expect the
following:
1. On a Treasury bond annual return of 4.8%, there should be about a 35% tax
rate for the highest federal tax bracket, and no other state and local taxes,
so that return would reduce to about 3.12%.
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2. On the equity return of 9.5%, there should be about 20% federal tax rate at
the highest tax bracket, plus another 8.82% for, say, New York State, plus
NYC taxes of about 3.8%, for a total of about 32.62% tax rate, which would
lower the net return to about 6.4%.
That means, in effect, a slightly smaller net disparity. Before, the differential
was 4.7%. With the tax load, it would be 3.28%. There is still a difference if you
compound annually. Actually, this is how 3.12% versus 6.4% compounded annually
looks like, this time, to make it simple, over 100 years:

The differential has shrunk considerably but remains important. And of
course, tax shelters and tax planning could help increase the net differential.
This is precisely what makes the proponents of capital investment so sure of
themselves and of their argument that everyone should prefer investing in the
stock markets—or even, that the federal government should replace Social Security
with individual stock market accounts. This is the strongest argument against
coöperatives and for capital investment: the long-term returns over the twentieth
century demonstrate that capital investment is the best thing to do with your
savings. In all likelihood, returns on mutual and coöperative equity will look more
like returns on bond obligations; therefore, coöperation is a non-starter.
The Response
The problem is that these differentials are purely and entirely man-made.
They are created, principally, by the tax code: by the favorable treatment of capital
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in general, or more specifically about all the legal and tax rules regarding the
inclusion of generous business expenses, the amortization of certain real estate,
the favorable treatment of capital gains, etc. All of the rules favor capital.
And as a result, the return on capital is greater than economic growth—that,
precisely, is the extraction of capital, the extraction of value from the corporate
enterprise that can be achieved by means of the code of capital. So, if you compare
the GDP growth rates for the United States to the growth of the S&P 500 (including
dividends), what you see is precisely the amount of extraction that is made possible
by our tax and corporate laws271:

Date

GDP
Growth (%)

Annual
Change

S&P 500

S&P 500 Growth
less GDP Growth (%)

12/31/99

4.7532

0.27

20.89%

16.14

12/31/00

4.1275

-0.63

-9.03%

-13.16

12/31/01

0.9983

-3.13

-11.85%

-12.85

12/31/02

1.7417

0.74

-21.97%

-23.71

12/31/03

2.8612

1.12

28.36%

25.50

12/31/04

3.7989

0.94

10.74%

6.94

12/31/05

3.5132

-0.29

4.83%

1.32

12/31/06

2.855

-0.66

15.61%

12.76

12/31/07

1.8762

-0.98

5.48%

3.60

12/31/08

-0.1366

-2.01

-36.55%

-36.41

12/31/09

-2.5368

-2.4

25.94%

28.48

12/31/10

2.5638

5.1

14.82%

12.26

12/31/11

1.5508

-1.01

2.10%

0.55

12/31/12

2.2495

0.7

15.89%

13.64

12/31/13

1.8421

-0.41

32.15%

30.31

12/31/14

2.452

0.61

13.52%

11.07

12/31/15

2.8809

0.43

1.38%

-1.50

12/31/16

1.5672

-1.31

11.77%

10.20

12/31/17

2.217

0.65

21.61%

19.39

12/31/18

3.1839

0.97

-4.23%

-7.41

12/31/19

2.3336

-0.85

31.22%

28.89
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SUM:

125.99

In real economic terms, all of that surplus of return on capital over basic
economic growth—126% over twenty years—is the product of the legal and tax
rules favoring capital. And that surplus is all man-made. It is not inherent to capital
investment. In other words, the 9.5% rate of return is not natural. It is the pure byproduct of a legal-political-economic regime that favors the capital investor. In a
similar fashion, the 4.8% return on Treasury bonds is a man-made artifact,
produced by the flow of capital to stock markets and by the U.S. government’s
promise to repay. In great part, it is an artifact of the shared belief that the U.S.
government is stable and will repay its loans. It is the product of the political
promise of the federal government. In other words, it is a political product.
Add to that that most major public corporations finesse the tax rules in such
a way as to actually glean tax revenues from the federal government. So, for
instance, in 2015, American Airlines made profits of over $4.6 billion, but received
a tax refund of almost $3 billion. From 2001 to 2014, Boeing made profits of $52.5
billion, yet received a net federal tax refund of $757 million and received as well
$55 million in state tax refunds. 272
There are then several man-made dimensions to the purportedly natural
higher return on capital investments.
First, the Treasury can attract investors by means of security and safety, and
as a result does not need to reward with rates of return equal to the riskier
corporate equity. That, of course, is a factor of the United States’ geopolitical
position and recent history of stability. It is a political artifact and would change
dramatically if, for instance, large sovereign investors, like China, sold their
Treasuries or decided to no longer buy any. It is entirely related to how much debt
the country has—although even that seems somewhat disconnected lately—and
its political track record of honoring its debt. The situation is clearly very different
for a country like Venezuela.
Second, capital returns are artificially inflated by the general exploitation of
labor: by not paying workers adequately, by perpetuating huge disparities with
management compensation, by not distributing profits to the workers, and by
relying on the federal government and states to support workers. So, for instance,
because Walmart does not pay a living wage, many of its employees rely on
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Medicaid for health insurance, food stamps to feed their families, and government
subsidized housing for their shelter. As a result, American taxpayers support
Walmart employees—and therefore underwrite Walmart itself—to the tune of
about $6.2 billion each year. Meanwhile, Walmart made almost $15 billion in
profits in 2015. For the fast-food industry, again because of unacceptably low
wages, American taxpayers spend about $7 billion a year subsidizing companies like
McDonald’s, Burger King, and Wendy’s. 273
Third, the differential is inflated because the management of public
companies extract and hoard the profits for capital investors. They distribute the
profit entirely to themselves, paying out dividends and buying back stock, gearing
everything toward profiting the shareholder and not the other persons affiliated
with their commerce.
Fourth, and most importantly, the differential is the product, mostly, of state
dirigisme that favors capital investors: bailouts in bad times; tax loopholes for
capitalists; tax breaks for capital gains; etc. If these were eliminated, the rates of
return on capital investments would decline because the profits would be
distributed more evenly and there would not be the hoarding or state-sanctioned
profiteering. So, the higher return on capital, again, is entirely man-made.
***
It is time to reverse those differentials so as to promote coöperation, equality, and
social justice.
Those differentials are man-made. They can be reengineered.
The laws of incorporation, the tax code, the government bailouts—they can
all be reconfigured to privilege mutuals and coöperatives so that the consumers,
workers, producers in this country get the benefit of economic growth.
It is simply a question of will.
Coöperation can be made to be more profitable.

Human Greed
This is not to suggest that it would be easy to create that will.
No, on the contrary, it will be extremely difficult to get people to agree to
eliminate the benefits of capital investment—and not just among capitalists, but
among all Americans who imagine or fantasize themselves to be one day wealthy
76
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3702010

capitalists. All those who buy into the American myth, including poor Americans on
Medicaid and food stamps working for Walmart.
Human greed is, of course, the major impediment to coöperation. Greed is
also the greatest threat to an ongoing coöperative enterprise.
And it is unlikely to go away any time soon.
Coöperation will not be easily achieved precisely because of the ideology of
capital investment. It may take a generation. Or perhaps the failure of purportedly
more radical change, like the supposed abolition of property.
But I believe it will come. I believe it is in our future. I believe it will, soon,
displace our punitive extractive liberal democratic regimes of capital.
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Chapter 5. The Long History of Coöperationism
Coöperationism is not a new idea. It has been around for generations—even in the
United States. In fact, it has existed under different rubrics for centuries. It has
never, however, triumphed. Now is its time.

Peter Kropotkin’s 1902 book, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution
Many trace the lineage of coöperationism through Peter Kropotkin’s 1902
book, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution.274 Kropotkin’s book was a scientific
intervention, intended to prove that solidarity, rather than competition, was
central to animal flourishing and evolution, including among humans. Although the
notion of evolution suggests that Kropotkin was writing in response to Charles
Darwin, he was actually responding more directly to the essay by Thomas Huxley,
“The Struggle for Existence.”275 Nevertheless, Kropotkin was clearly making an
evolutionary argument in the wake of Darwinian theory. As Jia Tolentino of the New
Yorker explains:
Kropotkin identifies solidarity as an essential practice in the lives of
swallows and marmots and primitive hunter-gatherers;
coöperation, he argues, was what allowed people in medieval
villages and nineteenth-century farming syndicates to survive. That
inborn solidarity has been undermined, in his view, by the principle
of private property and the work of state institutions. Even so, he
maintains, mutual aid is “the necessary foundation of everyday life”
in downtrodden communities, and “the best guarantee of a still
loftier evolution of our race.”276
Kropotkin, himself an anarchist, pushed his argument toward the abolition of
private property and state institutions.
Many political theorists, though, trace coöperationism further back to the
early nineteenth century and the social utopians like Henri de Saint-Simon, Robert
Owen, Charles Fourier, and Louis Blanc, as well as to the British practitioner,
William King. The histories of coöperatives and of the birth of the coöperatives
movement always refers primarily to Owen and Fourier. In Europe, a key historical
moment for the coöperatives movement was the establishment of the Rochdale
78
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3702010

Society of Equitable Pioneers in 1844, which is often considered to be the archetype
and exemplar for modern coöperative associations.277
In the United States, the histories of coöperatives most often pay homage to
Benjamin Franklin. Franklin founded a mutual fire insurance company in 1752, the
Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insurance of Houses from Loss by Fire, which
is considered by many as the first recognized coöperative business in the United
States and the oldest property insurance company in the country.278 It continues to
operate today under the name “The Philadelphia Contributionship.”279 Other key
historical moments for the emergence of coöperatives in the United States include
the organization in 1810 of the first recorded dairy and cheese coöperatives, which
were then followed by coöperatives for other agricultural commodities280; the
establishment of “The Cooperative League of the United States of America”
(CLUSA) in 1916, which was intended to promote a broad coöperative agenda281;
the passage of a first credit union statute in the state of Massachusetts in 1909282;
and the passage in 1922 of the Capper-Volstead Act, in response to the Sherman
Antitrust Act, allowing farmers to work together coöperatively, under certain
circumstances, to process and market commodities.283
Here, for instance, is a good illustration of a history of the coöperatives
movement from Lynn Pitman of the University of Wisconsin Center for
Cooperatives—a premier academic research center dedicated to the promotion of
coöperatives284:
The development of U.S. cooperative organizations is rooted in the
upheavals that characterized the Industrial Revolution in England
during 1750-1850. During this period many small, home-based
enterprises disappeared, forcing workers to move to cities where
they faced harsh working conditions and low wages. In rural areas,
the enclosure movement and changes in land tenure patterns drove
many small farmers off their lands into towns and cities looking for
work.
Building on trade and social guild traditions, mutual aid and
“friendly society” organizations sprang up to address the conditions
of the times, and contributed to the development of the
cooperative business ideas. Robert Owen (1771-1858) and Charles
Fourier (1772-1837), searching for paths to a more harmonious,
utopian society, articulated arguments that provided a broader
rationale for cooperative organizations.
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The more pragmatic William King (1786-1865) advocated the
development of consumer cooperatives to address working class
issues. His self-published magazine, “The Cooperator,” provided
information on cooperative practice as well as theory. King
emphasized small cooperatives that could be started with capital
supplied by members. He stressed the use of democratic principles
of governance, and the education of the public about cooperatives.
The wave of consumer cooperatives that followed were part of a
broader vision in which social needs could be met through
cooperative action. The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers,
considered the prototype for the modern cooperative association,
was organized in 1844.

A Recent Revival of Interest
Coöperationism is a topic of continued, if not increasing interest. Mutual aid
especially has become a hot topic and focus of attention during the COVID-19
pandemic and the economic crisis that has ensued.
Jia Tolentino of the New Yorker recently chronicled the different mutual aid
projects that have arisen organically throughout the United States in response to
the pandemic.285 Tolentino details, in inspiring ways, local mutual aid efforts, some
of which have grown nationwide—offering, for instance, free home delivery of
groceries by mutual aid volunteers to the elderly and infirm who are stuck at home
and at greatest risk of contagion. One of the associations, “Invisible Hands”—note
the ironic reference to Adam Smith! —was set in motion by a college junior, Liam
Elkind, and attracted over 1,200 volunteers in its first 96 hours in early March.286 It
spawned chapters around the country, delivering groceries to those in need. 287 By
mid-April, Invisible Hands had over 12,000 volunteers and had served about 4,000
requests for aid.288
Others who are deeply involved in the mutual aid movement during this
pandemic include the abolitionist Mariame Kaba, who is a devoted advocate of
mutual aid and perhaps most closely associated with the method; Representative
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who has worked with Kaba to promote mutual aid during
the pandemic; and Dean Spade as well, who is both a lawyer and critical theorist,
who recently wrote a piece in Social Text about all this called “Solidarity, Not
Charity.”289
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Looking around the world today, the anthropologist David Graeber—who
sadly passed away suddenly in September 2020—argues that mutual aid is more
relevant today than ever.290 Graeber identifies ongoing mutual aid projects in the
Democratic Federation of Northeast Syria (Rojava), the Occupy movements, the
migrant solidarity mobilizations in Greece, the Zapatista in Chiapas, and most
recently, the various solidarity aid projects addressing the Covid-19 pandemic, just
discussed. For this reason, Graeber penned, along with his co-author Andrej
Grubačić, a new introduction to Kropotkin’s book for a forthcoming edition.291 Few
young activists have read Kropotkin—which is in part why Graeber co-authored the
new preface—but their actions reflect the very core of mutual aid. As Graeber
wrote, “this book is being released in the belief that there is a new, radicalized
generation, many of whom have never been exposed to these ideas directly, but
who show all signs of being able to make a more clear-minded assessment of the
global situation than their parents and grandparents, if only because they know
that if they don’t, the world in store for them will soon become an absolute
hellscape.”292 These are some of the last words that Graeber left us 293:
We write this introduction during a wave of global popular revolt
against racism and state violence, as public authorities spew venom
against “anarchists” in much the way they did in Kropotkin’s time.
It seems a peculiarly fitting moment to raise a glass to that old
“despiser of law and private property” who changed the face of
science in ways that continue to affect us today. Pyotr Kropotkin’s
scholarship was careful and colorful, insightful and revolutionary. It
has also aged unusually well. Kropotkin’s rejection of both
capitalism and bureaucratic socialism, his predictions of where the
latter might lead, have been vindicated time and time again.
Looking back at most of the arguments that raged in his day, there’s
really no question about who was actually right.294

Clearing Some Ground | Owen, Fourier, Proudhon
It is crucial, though, to reset the dial on coöperation and not get caught in
the quagmire of earlier historical debates or different historical contexts. These are
very different times today than the early nineteenth century, and in the United
States, for the moment at least, we are past the period when wealthy industrialists,
like Robert Owen, or fanciful utopians, like Charles Fourier, marshalled
philanthropic ideals to relieve the misery of 5-year-old orphans working in
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factories. A lot of that ground needs to be cleared, especially today when the reality
and practice of mutuals and coöperative enterprises—from credit unions to mutual
insurance to worker coöperatives—have now been proven to be effective, perhaps
even more resilient than traditional corporations, and have such a solid track
record.
Robert Owen (1771–1858), for instance, prefigured a more just society and
had enlightened views for his time about educating and training the poor and
workers, in order to shape their character and eliminate misery, crime, and
punishment from society; but his writings are off-putting in important ways. This is
not to minimize his achievements. Owen experimented with enlightened factory
workshops and towns (New Lanark in Scotland and New Harmony in Indiana) that
provided housing, education, and welfare for the workers. He strongly believed in
government providing education and training for the poor. Owen is often called a
“utopian socialist,” though in reality he was more of a social reformer of a social
democrat or socialist style, who believed strongly in government welfare programs.
He is considered by many the father of the coöperative movement, but he did not
experiment so much with coöperatives, as he did with top-down social welfare
clusters, at his factory in New Lanark and his factory town in New Harmony. Owen
militated throughout his life for an 8-hour workday. He formed the Association of
all Classes of all Nations in 1835, which helped coin the term “socialism” and made
it current in British terminology. And, first in an essay published in 1813, then with
three additional essays revised and fully published in 1816-1817, Owen set out his
vision of a new society. He also proposed, in 1818, an outline of an ideal society in
a report to House of Commons on the Poor Laws.295
Owen righteously decried the condition of misery that plagued three-fourths
of the British population. He proclaimed essential truths about human conduct—
namely, that we can shape the character of humans through education and training
and formation, and that this will benefit everyone in society and relieve the
generalized conditions of misery—with the goal of enlightening political leaders
and the public, and with the underlying assumption that knowledge will produce
action. Owen explained patiently that the education and training and formation of
children will lead those who are excluded away from lives of crime and vice, toward
more productive lives of labor; and that this will benefit not only the excluded by
relieving their poverty, but will also benefit the privileged because they will be
better able to enjoy their advantages. His social aim was to bring about a society
without misery, without vice, and without punishment—in his words, “man may by
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degrees be trained to live in any part of the world without poverty, without crime,
and without punishment.”296
Owen also put his theory into practice—he is almost a perfect illustration of
critique and praxis: throughout, Owen emphasizes that what he was proposing not
only worked in theory but was also demonstrated in practice. He constantly
referred to putting his “principles into practice.”297 And he did, eventually losing all
his wealth as he tried to construct more just micro-societies.
But it is important to remember that he employed about 500 orphan children
aged 5 and 6 in the factory that he took over in 1784 in Glasgow—he referred to
them as “about five hundred children, who were procured chiefly from workhouses
and charities in Edinburgh.”298 Owen was writing as an industrialist and capitalist,
as someone who was interested in deriving profit from these reforms. He was
managing mills and trying to sustain himself on the profits from his private
enterprises. Owen makes this clear in an address to other industrialists at the
beginning of the third essay of A New View of Society:
Like you, I am a manufacturer for pecuniary profit. But having for
many years acted on principles the reverse in many respects of
those in which you have been instructed, and having found my
procedure beneficial to others and to myself, even in a pecuniary
point of view, I am anxious to explain such valuable principles, that
you and those under influence may equally partake of their
advantages.299
The profit motive is pervasive. The programs that Owen advanced, he writes
in essay three, “will yet appear, upon a full minute investigation by minds equal to
the comprehension of such a system, to combine a greater degree of substantial
comfort to the individuals employed in the manufactory, and of pecuniary profit to
the proprietors, than has hitherto been found attainable.”300 Owen appeals to the
proprietors’ keen sense of investment in machines—in equipment and
mechanisms—and then draws the parallel to “vital machines” or workers.301 He
refers to “living machinery,” that is, people, anticipating Gary Becker’s theory of
human capital.302 Tending to that living machinery, Owen argued, “will essentially
add to your gains.”303
None of this is to detract from the vision and justice of Robert Owen. He was
years ahead of his time in advocating for a social welfare state, for a “national” plan
for education and formation of character, for “the happiness of the community.”
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“The end of government is to make the governed and the governors happy,” he
declared. “That government then is the best, which in practice produces the
greatest happiness to the greatest number; including those who govern, and those
who obey.”304 He was years ahead of his time in creating socially reformed
workplaces. Nevertheless, he lived as an industrialist during a very different time
and there is little point returning to his rhetoric or set of arguments.
Coöperationism has advanced too much since his New View of Society.
The same is true of Charles Fourier (1772-1837), whose quixotic work, The
Theory of the Four Movements (1808), laid the foundation for a new political
economy of desire and labor, based on his extraordinarily imaginative
phalanstères—those self-sufficient autonomous utopian microcosms of 1,200
people designed for the benefit of workers and their families. Fourier was a brilliant
and radical thinker, one of the founders of utopian socialism, a feminist—in fact,
he allegedly is the one who used the term feminist first in 1837—and very forward
looking on issues of sexuality. His writings on the libidinal motivations for labor
inspired generations of thinkers at the intersection of coöperation and liberation,
from Kropotkin to Herbert Marcuse, André Breton, Roland Barthes, and Hakim
Bey.305
But here too, although he put coöperation at the center of his enterprise,
Fourier was wedded to the idea of profit and the desire for luxury, which he placed
at the emotional center of his project. The phalanxes would triumph, Fourier
argued, because of human greed and the desire for luxury. He wrote:
The strongest passion of peasants, as of city-dwellers, is a love of
profit. When they see an associative community yielding a profit
(other things being equal) three times as large as that produced by
a community of isolated families, as well as providing all its
members with the most varied pleasures, they will forget all their
rivalries and hasten to put association into practice. And no laws or
coercion will be necessary for this to spread to every part of the
world, because people everywhere are motivated by a desire for
wealth and pleasure.306
Fourier had in mind a new family organization, but one that included domestic
servants.307 Not only that, he had other failings. Fourier was anti-Semitic. He
believed that Jews, whom he associated with trade, were the source of evil and had
to be forced to do farm work. In fact, he advocated the return of Jews to Palestine.
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Again, there is no need to return to these debates and precursors of coöperation.
We are much further along.
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) as well, was deeply problematic in this
regard. Although he articulated and in part gave birth to mutualist philosophy,
although he coined the term “anarchist” and advocated the radical transformation
and abolition of property, Proudhon himself was anti-Semitic and sexist. His
confrontation with Marx, it turns out, was not purely intellectual. It was not just
about ideas. There was a deeply anti-Semitic dimension to it. This is what Proudhon
wrote about Jews (including Marx by name) in his private diaries in 1847, which
were only published in the 1960s:
December 26, 1847: Jews. Write an article against this race that
poisons everything by sticking its nose into everything without ever
mixing with any other people. Demand its expulsion from France
with the exception of those individuals married to French women.
Abolish synagogues and not admit them to any employment.
Demand its expulsion. Finally, pursue the abolition of this religion.
It’s not without cause that the Christians called them deicides. The
Jew is the enemy of humankind. They must be sent back to Asia or
be exterminated. H. Heine, A. Weill, and others are nothing but
secret spies; Rothschild, Crémieux, Marx, Fould, wicked, bilious,
envious, bitter, etc. etc. beings who hate us. The Jew must
disappear by steel or by fusion or by expulsion. Tolerate the elderly
who no longer have children. Work to be done – What the peoples
of the Middle Ages hated instinctively I hate upon reflection and
irrevocably. The hatred of the Jew like the hatred of the English
should be our first article of political faith. Moreover, the abolition
of Judaism will come with the abolition of other religions. Begin by
not allocating funds to the clergy and leaving this to religious
offerings. – And then, a short while later, abolish the religion.308
Proudhon was also sexist and wrote in his journals that women should either
be courtesans or housekeepers. In addition, he added, women should be the
dominion of their masters, men.309
There is in fact a long and difficult history between socialism (even utopian
socialism) and anti-Semitism, tracing back to Fourier and Proudhon and others. This
is a rich topic. But there is no need to return there. To be sure, the internal debates
between Proudhon and Marx on property,310 or between Proudhon and Blanc on
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the organization of worker workshops,311 are theoretically rich and informative. But
again, we have learned so much since then, and coöperation has evolved so much
since the nineteenth century, so there is little point returning to those ideological
debates.

Reimagining Coöperation
Instead of going back to those debates and early writings, it is better to use
them as a way to distinguish and reimagine a new coöperationism for our time.
Mutual Aid
A good illustration is Kropotkin’s notion of mutual aid and its modern forms.
It is helpful to use these as a foil—as a way to sharpen the present argument for
coöperation by differentiating it from some dimensions of mutual aid.
The theory of mutual aid can sometimes elide the structural failures that are
the root cause of the problems that give rise to the very need for mutual aid. At
other times, the concept of mutual aid comes too close to charitable work. It is
problematic, for instance, that some proponents glorify mutual aid, arguing that it
works better than state or top-down measures, and as a result (1) ignore the fact
that the problems are the product of indifference and structural racism, poverty,
classism, and gender discrimination, and (2) suggest that we would all be better off
with no state interventions. Dean Spade gets to this in his essay, “Solidarity, Not
Charity,” when he argues that most of the media stories about recent mutual aid
efforts elide the structural causes of the problems; and when he argues that they
feed into the rhetoric of small government.312
Another concern with mutual aid is that it only really addresses one small or
tiny segment of coöperation, the sector that relates to charitable works, non-profit
service, or what might be called public service—altruistic projects aimed at
relieving the immediate effects of poverty and hunger and sickness. This raises
several problems.
First, it has an anarchist bent that may be detrimental to coöperation: the
impetus and force of coöperatives and mutuals may well be that the individual
workers and members drive the enterprise, and in this sense, many of these
initiatives are bottom-up or grass-roots; but that does not signify in any way that
there is no need for an organizational mechanism or regulatory framework to
administer and ensure the smooth functioning of these initiatives. Coöperationism
is not anarchism. It may devalue the dirigiste elements of the state (by, among
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other things, placing ultimate decision-making in the hands of elected members of
coöperatives), but it does not do away with the state necessarily.
Second, it takes a part for the whole: mutual aid is just one type of
coöperationist enterprise, and it fits alongside housing and worker coöperatives,
credit unions, mutuals, etc. Each one of these types of enterprise will have their
own unique features. Mutual aid may appear to require less state intervention than
worker coöperatives, but that is only because state regulation is often so hidden. It
is pervasive in the mutual aid context: the state licenses food services and has OSHA
regulations for the groceries where Invisible Hands’ Elkind shopped (Fairway
Markets), as well as all kinds of worker and other regulations, FDA etc. And these
differ from the kinds of regulations that would be necessary for banking through
credit unions. Each one of these will need their own conceptualization, and we
could never say that “mutual aid” governs those other areas—that makes far too
many assumptions and simplifications about coöperationism.
Third, mutual aid does not really address root causes, despite its oftrepeated claims: these mutual aid projects are more temporary remedies, than
solutions to the problems. They are valiant forms of self-help, but they depend on
some of us having enough money to volunteer and shop for others, for instance in
the Invisible Hands initiative. They build solidarity and reorient our moral
compass—all good—but do not resolve the structural problems that give rise to
capitalist exploitation. When Tolentino writes in the New Yorker that “Both mutual
aid and charity address the effects of inequality, but mutual aid is aimed at root
causes—at the structures that created inequality in the first place,”313 I have to
disagree. Other forms of coöperation will get at the root causes, but not the mutual
aid projects. Tolentino links in the article to the Big Door Brigade.314 The Big Door
Brigade is a project that Dean Spade has been involved with.315 On its website, built
by and maintained by him, Dean Spade explains:
Mutual aid is when people get together to meet each other’s basic
survival needs with a shared understanding that the systems we live
under are not going to meet our needs and we can do it together
RIGHT NOW! Mutual aid projects are a form of political participation
in which people take responsibility for caring for one another and
changing political conditions, not just through symbolic acts or
putting pressure on their representatives in government, but by
actually building new social relations that are more survivable.
Most mutual aid projects are volunteer-based, with people jumping
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in to participate because they want to change what is going on right
now, not wait to convince corporations or politicians to do the right
thing.316
To be sure, mutual aid embraces a notion of people building new social relations
and taking matters in their own hands and taking responsibility; but that is not the
equivalent, I would argue, to addressing the structural problems of capitalist
exploitation (unless, backing up to the first point, you are an anarchist). So again,
more needs to be added to really address the root problems.
This is not to impugn mutual aid in any way. There is a long and admirable
history to mutual aid that goes back to the Black Panther Party’s free-breakfast
program in the United States in the 1960s and well before; and that extends to
ongoing initiatives like the groups that leave water in the desert for immigrants
crossing the border (the No More Deaths collective).317 There is a strong parallel
between mutual aid and Occupy Wall Street: the idea of prefiguring another form
of democracy. Kaba talks about the practice of mutual aid as “prefiguring the world
in which we want to live.”318 That was, as you will recall, a constant refrain of
Occupy and of Judith Butler’s work on assembly. 319
But mutual aid is only one small dimension of a society built on coöperation,
one dimension which has its own peculiarities. It should not be built up to represent
the whole. For one thing, it simply does not constitute a viable economic system
for production and growth. Contemporary coöperationist enterprises do.
The American Coöperative Movement
In a similar vein, it is important to distinguish reimagined coöperation from
the trajectory of the coöperatives movement in the United States, which gradually
became reformist—especially during the Cold War, when it veered conservative.
The movement has a long and august history that traces to the early
twentieth century. The Cooperative League of the United States of America was
founded in 1916 with the righteous ambition of creating a “Cooperative
Commonwealth.”320 The league was principally about consumer coöperatives. It
quickly won the support of the likes of John Dewey and Walter Lippmann. 321
The Cooperative League was inspired at first, at least in part, by the writings
of Kropotkin. Its founder, James Peter Warbasse, was a doctor who argued, in his
own words, that “The forces which promote co-operation are the natural human
instincts, the inherent animal tendency toward mutual aid, which has existed as a
biological necessity since animals began, and without which the race would
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perish.”322 One can hear Kropotkin in these words, and in fact Warbasse cited to
Kropotkin’s work in his manifesto, Co-operative Democracy (New York: MacMillan
Co., 1923).323 There were, of course, other influences—and his writings reflect an
eclectic theoretical mix:
His theory of consumers cooperation … was drawn primarily from
two French theorists, Charles Gide and Ernest Poisson. He borrowed
both from Marxian socialism and Kropotkin’s mutual
associationalism. Good nineteenth century secular and religious
humanitarianism obviously infused his whole approach to life. He
may not have been a careful student of either William James or John
Dewey, but pragmatism came naturally to influence his beliefs. For
all this eclecticism his system was surprisingly logical, coherent, and
persuasive.324
There are many strengths to build on here. For instance, there were times
when the Cooperative League presciently prefigured the ideals of a reimagined
coöperationism. At an early stage, Warbasse imagined “co-operative democracy”
as a third way, an alternative to both capitalism and socialism. Warbasse positioned
himself politically as opposed both to capitalism and socialism:
Capitalism was doomed; but its declared alternative, the socialist
state, was equally to be feared. Co-operation offered the only valid
way to win a new world. The need was for the application of
“constructive social engineering” to usher in, by evolutionary steps,
a cooperative society. Both capitalism and socialism tended toward
statism. […] The paternal state, welfare capitalist or socialist,
corroded the self-reliance of the people, destroyed their initiative,
usurped their liberties. The paternal state led to insolence and
arrogance on the one hand, and indifference and submission on the
other.325
Notice how coöperation is here situated against both capitalism and socialism as
too statist, too dirigiste. I share in that assessment.
But here too, there were warning signs and prejudices to avoid. According to
an early commentator by the name of Clarke Chambers, “Warbasse’s view of the
human animal, like that of most of his associates, preferred Kropotkin’s Darwinism
to Sumner’s. The instinct for mutual aid was fortified by other inherent tendencies
or ingrained racial habits—‘natural good-heartedness, the inherent sense of
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justice, the fairness, and the good-will of human beings.’”326 The deeply troubling
reference to “racial habits” reflects the fact that much of the coöperatives
movement in the United States formed in homogenous ethnic areas, Finns and
Swedes in the Mid-West for instance; and so here too we need to distance
ourselves from these writings and their biases. The references to social evolution
and racial habits are simply unacceptable.327
Moreover, in the post-war period, the Cooperative League became more
conservative, especially as the Cold War began. In 1946, a designated language
committee “recommended that there be no more ‘indiscriminate’ criticism of
capitalism, for that merely aroused hostility and misunderstanding. ‘Indiscriminate
attacks on 'capitalism' may cause the speaker to be classified as a communist or
fascist.’ A better tactic was to demonstrate that an unregulated profit drive led to
monopoly. ‘Many who are alienated by an attack on 'capitalism' will heartily
support opposition to monopoly.’ Avoid use of the old term ‘Cooperative
Commonwealth,’ the committee urged, for it suggests that all enterprise should be
taken over by cooperatives ‘which is neither true nor possible.’”328
The Cooperative League also played into an imaginary of ownership. During
and after the Great Depression, leaders of the Cooperative League argued that
capitalism had failed and presented coöperatives as the best alternative to
capitalism and communism. “America was at a cross-roads: it could swing down the
right hand path to dictatorial fascism, down the left hand road to totalitarian
socialism, or toil down the straight and narrow path toward a consumers
cooperative society,” Chambers writes, describing the arguments of the leader,
Eugene R. Bowen. “Cooperation was the peaceful way out, depending on neither
‘bullets nor ballots,’ and was the means by which Americans would come to own
America.”329
Today, the Cooperative League is part of the National Cooperative Business
Association.330 It is part of a more mainstream business environment. Chambers
retraces the variegated ideological history of the Cooperative League in the
following terms:
The Cooperative League grew out of Jewish democratic socialism
and fraternalism and out of Finnish radicalism. Under Warbasse’s
leadership the League’s official theory was close to a benevolent
form of anarchism that predicted the withering away of the state as
the cooperative commonwealth was gradually established. With
Bowen the great agricultural purchasing associations were brought
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into the League, which they soon dominated. With this
development, during the terrible crisis of the depression decade,
the League moved gently away from rigid neutralism toward social
reform through political action, and tempered its earlier utopianism
by more practical programs. With Lincoln and Voorhis, the League
fully accepted the sector ideal of the Swedish cooperative
movement without for a moment surrendering its reform urge. The
League can be found today campaigning for every good cause of
political and social liberalism.331
These pendulum swings reflect the geopolitical shifts of the twentieth
century.
We need not subject ourselves today, however, to the aftershocks of those
histories. The Russian Revolution, the Great Depression, the Cold War,
McCarthyism—those pushed and pulled the Cooperative League in different
directions. We need not follow those vicissitudes today.
We can reimagine coöperation for our times.
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Conclusion
“What more am I to do?” That is where I left off in Critique & Praxis.
The question today is more urgent than ever. The COVID-19 pandemic
confirmed everything we know about the ills of society, its inequalities and failures.
It confirmed the racial hierarchy and caste system in this country. It affirmed
everything we suspected about precarity and the lack of universal health care,
about who is truly vulnerable in our society, about the hidden interests of our
leaders. We knew all that. The pandemic just confirmed it—as the Great Recession
of 2008 had years before.
And it confirmed that we must focus in a renewed way on the goal of social
transformation—of revolutionary change. The task now, as I see it, is to singlemindedly and tenaciously, like a laser, keep our eyes on the prize: revolutionizing
our unequal and unjust society and creating a just society.
My goal now, more explicitly than ever, is to identify, imagine, or reimagine
the revolution: what must it look like today, and how will it succeed in bringing
about a more just and equal society? Everything I do, everything I write, every
action I take must now pursue the mission of revolutionizing our society.
W.E.B. Du Bois’s Darkwater reaffirmed this for me.332 The resoluteness of his
writing, the certainty of his ideas, the clarity of his vision, Du Bois leaves us with no
doubt about our circumstances (circa 1919) and what we should do, perhaps even
today:
If the attitude of the European and American worlds is in the future
going to be based essentially upon the same policies as in the past,
then there is but one thing for the trained man of darker blood to
do and that is definitely and as openly as possible to organize his
world for war against Europe. 333
Yes, war against Europe—and not just Europe, but “Europe” as standing in
for practices of exploitation, racism, colonialism, and all the other forms of
oppression associated with our governing political economic regime of tournament
dirigisme maintained by the police state.
Du Bois put much of his faith in education. Speaking of persons of color first,
Du Bois wrote (and these are ominous words prefiguring our current carceral
state): “We bury genius; we send it to jail; we ridicule and mock it, while we send
mediocrity and idiocy to college, gilded and crowned.”334 He militated for education
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for all, not just whites or the wealthy. “All children are the children of all and not of
individuals and families and races,” he insisted. “The whole generation must be
trained and guided and out of it as out of a huge reservoir must be lifted all genius,
talent, and intelligence to serve all the world.” 335
Yes, education must be a priority—critical education that is. But much more
is needed now. It is time for a revolution in how we govern ourselves and others.
***
The only way forward is a genuine transformation that replaces our existing
extractive punitive regime with coöperative, mutualist, solidaristic, and non-profit
enterprises. The legal structure that enables the corporate form—what Katharina
Pistor accurately calls the “code of capital”—has to be repealed and replaced with
a new economic framework that circulates the wealth generated from production
and consumption. By replacing the logic of capital extraction—the extractive logic
as Saskia Sassen calls it—with an ethos of equitable distribution, we can also
prepare to address the climate crisis after the pandemic is over.336
It is not enough to increase progressive wealth taxes on the billionaires and
invest more in public hospitals and public schools, as Piketty recently suggested.337
That will not fundamentally change the Faustian logic and temptations. Instead,
and urgently, it is time to replace our system of tournament dirigisme with a new
cöoperationism.
This pandemic and economic crash must not prevent us from working
together to place ourselves in a better position to deal with the other crisis—
climate change—still looming on the horizon. On the contrary, these times call for
a legal, political, and economic revolution to ring in a new epoch of coöperationism.
This will demand political will. It will not come from our political leaders, so
beholden now to corporate contributions. It will have to come from us all united.
***
In the end, capitalism is a misnomer, and communism a non-starter. Only
coöperationism will achieve a just society.
“Capitalist” economies, it was widely believed, were governed by the
economic laws of capital: both the strongest proponents of capitalism (the free
market economists of the Chicago School) and its staunchest opponents (Marxists
and anarchists) held that capital has inherent traits that produce good (or bad)
outcomes—that capital, in effect, has a force of its own. This reflected the
materialism of Marx: capitalist modes of production necessarily cause increased
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exploitation and decreased profitability that autonomously destroy capitalism. It
was also reflected in the magical thinking of the Chicago School and its precursors
going back to Mandeville and Smith: the private vices and greedy pursuit of capital
autonomously causes (through the invisible hand) the greatest public virtue.
But capital does not exist as an autonomous thing. It is a creature of the
human laws of corporations. It can be privileged or disfavored. There are no
independent laws of capital, and even the greedy taste that humans have
developed for capital returns are not immutable laws of nature. The “capitalist”
crises of accumulation that plague Western post-industrial societies are not an
artifact of capital, but rather of tournament dirigisme.
“Communism” is equally misleading and no more promising. The valiant idea
of living together in common may possibly work at times for a small commune, but
it does not scale up to the level of a large economy. The problem is principally one
of scaling. It too produces a form of dirigisme.
The state and these forms of dirigisme—hand in hand with the police state—
have taken center stage for too long now. They are, however, merely a historical
phase in human history. As Foucault demonstrated in Security, Territory,
Population, the concept of the state was born at a certain period (with the theories
of raison d’État) and has dominated our conception of governance over the past
three or so centuries.338 But before that, there may have been monarchies, or even
empires—and after that, there will be coöperation.
It is time to end our various experiments in statism and dirigisme and to
embrace a new form of coöperationism. It is time to be guided by the principles of
solidarity.
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Postscript: Abolition Democracy 13/13
This is a work in abolition democracy. It follows in the footsteps of W.E.B. Du
Bois, Angela Davis, Dorothy E. Roberts, and others. It seeks to abolish our racist,
extractive, punitive society—to abolish everything that makes our punitive society
possible—in order to reimagine and instantiate a coöperationist future infused
with the values of solidarity, equality, and social justice reflected in the “one vote
principle” and non-hierarchy of mutual relations.339
This project is grounded in the connections between all the different aspects
of our extractive, punitive, caste society today—all the ways in which the
punitiveness and extractive nature of tournament dirigisme, the forms of inequality
and racial hierarchy, and human greed work together and build on each other.
Proudhon had argued for the abolition of property. “I prove that those who
do not possess today are proprietors by the same title as those who do possess;
but instead of inferring from this that property should be shared by all, I demand,
as a measure of general security, its entire abolition.” 340 For all his weaknesses,
Proudhon had tapped into something important: social revolution must go through
the paths of abolition and address the question of property.
In fact, social progress has been the history of abolishing forms of property.
All the turning points of liberation are tied in some way to abolishing a property
relationship:
• The abolition of feudalism was the end of a proprietary relationship of
serfdom.
• The abolition of slavery was the abolition of a property relationship over
persons (with the exception of the prison).
• The abolition of coverture and of the marital rights of the husband was the
abolition of a property relationship over women.
• The abolition of the prison, as the last remaining exception to slavery
under the 13th Amendment, will be the end of the prison as the final
exception to property in persons.
Today, it is time for the abolition of the type of property that constitutes
capital. In this sense, this work is more than a work in “political economy.” It is a
work in abolition democracy.
***
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Historically, the term “political economy” corresponds to an intellectual
conversation or discourse or proto-discipline (in the academic sense of discipline)
that began in the late-eighteenth century in England and Western Europe, and
prefigured the birth of the social sciences, especially economics, political science,
and sociology. It offered a new way to understand the historical development of
Western society. Although shaped by other discourses, such as natural law theory,
theories of moral sentiment, and the tradition of raison d’État (reason of state), it
displaced those and for a while—at least, some of us believe—was a dominant way
of interpreting the then-present.
To be very specific, one could trace its birth to the interval between Smith’s
Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1759, and his Wealth of Nations,
published in 1776.341 The latter depended entirely, intellectually, on the former;
but it assumed it, and did not make the connections explicitly. In that implicit
severing, we could say, political economy was born. And it would develop at that
time in the work of David Ricardo, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Karl Marx, and others.
But it is no longer, today, a discourse that lives. It was displaced in the
twentieth century by modern welfare economics on the one hand and by rational
choice theory in political science. To be sure, there were ways to interpret
subsequent debates in the twentieth century—for instance, between Keynes and
Hayek, or the writings of Karl Polanyi and Joseph Schumpeter—as emanations in
political economy or continuations of that discourse; and even more contemporary
economic writings, such as those of Thomas Piketty, are and can be placed in
conversation with Smith and Marx. But those are more nostalgic than real, and
allusions rather than substance: we refer back to Marx and “laws of capital,” but
we do not really engage his theory of value or exchange. We do not continue the
conversation they had in the nineteenth century about the difference between use
value and exchange value, for instance—which was at the heart of so many debates
in political economy.
Today, those writings in political economy are primarily material for
historians and economic historians. But we have learned far too much since then,
and refined coöperation, to be limited to those debates and ideas.
To be sure, what the term “political economy” offers, that for instance
“economics” alone does not, is to emphasize the necessarily political dimension to
economic regimes. That is key. In fact, it is central to this project. It means we no
longer talk about “capitalism,” but instead about “tournament dirigisme.”
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But that is not a reason to return to an exhausted discourse or protodiscipline. It is far better to make that argument in plain terms, without unearthing
all the writings from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Those writings
introduce biases and errors. Returning to them is a quagmire. We have lost
decades’ worth of intellectual exchange for a simple or basic intervention.
So yes, we need to emphasize the political dimension of economics today.
But we do not need to appropriate an exhausted label, “political economy.” This
does not mean we cast aside all those texts. To the contrary, we should engage
those texts and read them closely, but not because they anchor our present, rather
for another reason: because they were grappling with central questions of
property, government, and community, and offer lenses and arguments about
those that we should discuss in our own formulations of governing. We should use
them as foils to refine coöperation and, just as often, as prejudices and biases to
avoid.
***
In sum, we need to understand the project of coöperation as in direct lineage to
the project of abolition democracy. In direct continuity with:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

W.E.B. Du Bois and Angela Davis on “Abolition Democracy”342
The abolition of slavery343
The abolition of coverture and marital dominion
The abolition of capital punishment344
The abolition of prisons345
The abolition of our punitive society and incarceration346
The abolition of the police347
Abolition constitutionalism348
And in conversation with the abolition of property, of oil, and of borders. 349

Welcome to Abolition Democracy 13/13. Please join the seminar here:
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/abolition1313/.
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